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The HIV Positive Health Care
Clinician
Rights, Obligations, and the Academy
Sherman L. Cohn, J.D.

On Point
The questions raised by a case of an HIV positive student-clinician
in an acupuncture school provide an analytical framework for
considering the many conflicts raised by HIV positive health care
providers in general. A number of conflicting social values are
discussed in the context of federal and Maryland state law. HIV
positive people are protected by certain antidiscrimination laws,
provided they do not pose a significant risk of transmission. This
protection must be balanced against the rights of patients to
informed consent, the relative risk of a relatively noninvasive
procedure such as acupuncture, and the academic freedom of
the school to determine the qualifications of its graduates and
the methods by which they are educated. This evaluation and
balancing of competing values on a case by case basis provides
the most rational and effective policy for dealing with infected
providers.

The

following paper is taken from an extensive

opinion letter prepared for the Traditional
Acupuncture Institute, a school for the education and training of acupuncturists in Columbia,
Maryland. A student at the Institute who is HIV
positive is about to enter clinical training as a part of
the educational process. Although the paper is prepared in the context of a student-clinician in an acupuncture school, the author believes that the principles developed and the values discussed are equally
valid to all health care workers and provide an analytical framework for consideration of how to treat all
HIV positive health care workers.
The discussion to date has focused mainly upon
the HIV positive surgeon and dentist, who are thought
to provide a greater risk because each works inside an
open wound or cavity of the patient, where there are
present sharp instruments on which it is possible for
the surgeon and dentist to be cut and release his or
her own blood to mingle with the blood of the patient.
Although there is some doubt as to the reality of that
risk, it at most poses a risk greater than that posed by
other health care workers who do not work inside open
wounds or cavities of patients. It is believed that the
analytical framework is the same, although, with enhanced risk thrown into the analytical balance, the

result may be different than the result with health
care workers other than surgeons and dentists.
This paper also includes a discussion of the role
of the academy, as the particular problem considered
was a student-clinician in a professional level school.
The analytical framework presented, however, would
appear to be valid in any setting of the employment
of an HIV positive health care worker and at least
helpful to the health care worker who is in a private
practice of his or her own and deals directly with a
patient who comes to him or her for health care.
Further, the paper focuses upon the state law of
Maryland as well as an ordinance of the county in
which the acupuncture school is located. Although
there will be variations in state and county law, and
many probably do not have law as specific as that
found here, this discussion was left in the paper as an
illustration of the problems that can be posed by local
law. The federal law discussion, of course, is equally
applicable throughout the United States.
Finally, it must be recognized that both the scientific knowledge and the law in this area continue to
develop. Since the preparation of this paper, there
have been developments in both arenas. Some of these
developments are discussed in an extensive postscript
to this paper. Furthermore, even the postscript was
completed before the publication of new guidelines
from the Centers for Disease Control. These new
guidelines are expected at any time. It is currently
expected that the new CDC guidelines will be limited
to surgeons and dentists. [Note: these new guidelines
were published in the Federal Register on July 12,
1991, after the completion of this article.]

This opinion is based upon the following factual
assumptions:
1. A student now at the college is HIV positive.
He has advised the college of this fact. This advice
has been circulated to all other students, faculty,
and staff either by the student or by the college
with the concurrence of the student. Although it
is unknown how much further the student has
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made his condition known, it is clear that he has
made no effort to keep his condition confidential
from the college community.
2. Today's scientific knowledge is clear that
HIV is infectious, but that the infection is transmitted through blood and blood products, sexual
contact, and perinatally from a mother to her
fetus. But only someone already infected with HIV
can transmit the virus, and transmission must be
direct (i.e., blood to blood, blood to mucosal membranes, etc.). It cannot be transmitted through
casual contact or through airborne particles.
3. The college practices generally accepted
procedures to prevent the spread of infection to
patients. In particular, no needles are to be used
in more than one person. The college uses disposable needles in all but a very small number of
procedures where disposable needles are not available. Where a nondisposable needle is utilized, the
college sterilizes that needle in an autoclave before
it is used again. Such sterilization procedures are
adequate to prevent the transmission of HIV as
well as hepatitis and other diseases. The college's
rules also provide that no practitioner shall treat
a patient if the practitioner has any exudative
lesions. Moreover, the college insists that all lesions, even microlesions, be securely covered by
bandage or bandaid. Upon the following of these
universal precautions, there is no realistic threat
of transmission of an HIV infection from practitioner to patient.
4. Some people, probably many people, are
emotional and irrational on the subject of AIDS.
Thus, although rationally there may be no realistic
threat of transmission, some people still exhibit
emotional and psychological trauma due to irrational fears of transmission. This emotional and
psychological trauma is real and can lead to symptoms that are also real.
It must be recognized at the outset that government at various levels has undertaken to lessen the
impact on the HIV positive and even active AIDS
patient of the emotional and irrational fears of transmittal of AIDS. This has been attempted by the federal government through the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, which has been applied by the Supreme Court
to a matter of health (tuberculosis), and by lower
courts to persons who are HIV positive. More recently,
Congress has expanded this attempt in the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). The State of
Maryland has undertaken this attempt by statute, and
Howard County has aimed at the same result through
its Human Rights ordinance. That ordinance has been
applied by the Howard County Human Rights Commission to bar discrimination against a person on the
ground that he is HIV positive.
It must also be recognized that any health care
procedure, including acupuncture, can be performed
on a patient only with the informed consent of that
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patient. And in Maryland the law bestows on the
practitioner the duty of advising the patient of everything, including every risk, that a reasonably prudent
patient would need to know to make an informed and
intelligent decision. There are now pending at least
three cases in a Maryland Circuit Court against Johns
Hopkins University Hospital that raise the issue
whether, before operating on a patient, a surgeon, as
a part of obtaining the informed consent of the patient, must advise the patient that he, the surgeon, is
HIV positive. Each of those cases has been brought
by a former patient who is not HIV positive and thus
presents no evidence of actual transmission of HIV.
Finally, the federal Centers for Disease Control
has recognized that there is a dentist who was HIV
positive and who probably transmitted HIV to one,
and possibly five, patients. Although this is the only
known probable transmittal from an HIV positive
health care worker to a patient, it has led the American
Medical Association and the American Dental Association to issue new guidelines for the conduct of HIV
positive health care workers and for the Centers for
Disease Control to reconsider its guidelines issued in
1987.
Each of these matters must be considered in some
depth in arriving at a decision as to conduct that is
legally prudent. But there is still more that must be
considered: the broader ethics that takes into consideration the HIV positive student, the well-being of the
patient, the college, its teaching mission and its
broader community, and the healing process that is
the reason that the patient comes to the college, that
the student is enrolled at the college, and that represents the college's very raison d'6tre.

I. Governmental Regulation: Protection of the
Handicapped
There is no basis for considering legal rights of
the HIV positive student aside from those provided
by federal, state, or county legislation. The college is
a private, nongovernmental entity, and thus is not
subject to any direct federal constitutional restrictions
on its actions. Nor are there any applicable provisions
of the Maryland constitution. Thus, any restrictions
on the action that the college, in its considered judgment, believes to be best in its treatment of this or
any other student must be found in statute or regulations, as construed by courts.

A. Federal Statute
The two applicable federal statutes are the Rehabilitation Action of 1973 and the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990. As these statutes may apply
differently to the current HIV positive student and to
future students in a like situation, they must be considered separately.
1. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973. As amended
through 1988, the Act declares its purpose to be "to
29

develop and implement, through ... the guarantee of

equal opportunity ... and independent living, for individuals with handicaps in order to maximize their
employability, independence, and integration into the
workplace and the community."I
Section 504 of the Act 2 declares that "No otherwise qualified individual with handicaps ... shall,

solely by reason of her or his handicap, be excluded
from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance . .

..

There are several factors here that must be explored. First, we must consider what is meant by a
"program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance"; second, who is an "individual with handicaps" within the meaning of this Act; and, third,
whether under the "otherwise qualified" language or
otherwise, there is any requirement under the Act to
accommodate the handicap of the individual.
The Rehabilitation Act does not apply to all educational institutions or all businesses. It applies only
to those that "receiv[e] Federal financial assistance."
Case law makes it clear that merely being a charitable
corporation and thus tax exempt under Section
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Act is not enough
to be covered by the Act. Case law also makes it
clear that, if the clinic or health practitioner receives
reimbursement under medicare or medicaid, that is
enough "federal assistance" for the Act to apply.' 7
And that such a clinic (indeed, in dicta, even a private
practitioner in his nonclinic office) may not refuse to
perform elective surgery because the patient has
symptomatic AIDS.'

Finally, there is no case that holds that a school
that has a student who has a federally insured student
loan, or even receives a direct federal loan or grant,
receives such "federal assistance" as to be covered
within the Act. And an opinion of the Department of
Justice holds that that is not enough.' Of course,
should a school receive any federal money for research,
staff support, or any other purpose, the Act applies.
Thus, in my opinion, if a school receives no direct
federal funding and if its clinic does not receive medicare or medicaid reimbursement, the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 does not apply, even though students in
the school may receive federally guaranteed loans or
direct loans or grants from the federal government.
But, if a school or its clinic receives any federal
funding, including medicare or medicaid reimbursement, the Rehabilitation Act does apply.
An "individual with handicaps" is defined by Section 7 of the Acto as a person who:
(i) has a physical or mental impairment which
substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities,
(ii) has a record of such an impairment, or
(iii) is regarded as having such an impairment.
The Supreme Court has held that this definition includes a person who is infected with tuberculosis.'
30

Arline, an elementary school teacher, was held to be
handicapped because her tuberculosis had adversely
affected her respiratory system, requiring hospitalization. This condition was held to limit substantially

Ifa school or its clinic receives any federal
funding, including medicare or medicaid
reimbursement, the Rehabilitation Act does
apply.
one of her major life activities and thus brought her
within the Act. The fact that she was also contagious
"does not suffice to remove [her] from coverage under
§ 504."112
Congress thereafter amended the Act'" to provide
that the term "individual with handicaps"
does not include an individual who has a currently
contagious disease or infection and who, by reason
of such disease or infection, would constitute a
direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals or who, by reason of the currently contagious disease or infection, is unable to perform the
duties of the job.
(Emphasis added). This language was added by the
Harkin-Humphrey amendment to the Civil Rights
Restoration Act of 1988, at least partially in response
to Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Arline disagreeing with the majority on the ground that Congress
in the 1973 Act had not stated that the protection of
the Act was extended to those with contagious or
infectious diseases.' 4
Clearly by necessary implication, Congress ratified the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act to apply to a person with a currently
contagious disease or infection. And the legislative
debates make it very clear that that was the intent of
Congress.'" Also, quite clearly, Congress intended that
someone who is HIV positive be covered by the Act.
That is, the holding of each of the courts that has
considered the issue."
While these cases antedated the Harkins-Humphrey amendment, the debates on the passage of that
amendment reflect that they correctly read the intent
of Congress.' 7
There thus can be no doubt that the 1973 Rehabilitation Act applies its protections to persons who
are HIV infected. But this raises the question of
whether the protection of the Act extends to persons
who are HIV infected but are asymptomatic, so that
they, in fact, can work, attend classes, and otherwise
function. Upon analysis, the answer is in the affirmative.
First, it should be noted that the Surgeon General
of the United States, C. Everett Koop, has stated that
it is
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inappropriate to think of [HIV infection] as composed of discrete conditions such as ARC [AIDSrelated complex] or "full blown" AIDS. HIV infection is the starting point of a single disease
which progresses through a variable range of
stages. In addition to an acute flu-like illness, early
stages of the disease may involve subclinical manifestations, i.e., impairments and no visible signs
of illness.
On the basis of these facts, the Surgeon General
concluded that
from a purely scientific perspective, persons with
HIV infection are clearly impaired. They are not
comparable to an immune carrier of a contagious
disease such as Hepatitis B. Like a person in the
early stages of cancer, they may appear outwardly
healthy but are in fact seriously ill.'"
Furthermore, the term "physical impairment" within
the meaning of "individual with handicaps" has been
defined by the Department of Health and Human
Services, in its regulations implementing Section 504
of the 1973 Act, as follows:
[Any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting
one or more of the following body systems: neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs;
respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary;
hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine. 9
The United States Department of Justice, in issuing an opinion that an asymptomatic individual who
is HIV positive is handicapped within the meaning of
this regulation, has pointed to the fact that such an
individual will begin to restrict his own activity, particularly in the area of procreation and intimate personal relations, and that in effect is a "physical impairment" within the meaning of the regulation.2 0
Second, the 1973 Rehabilitation Act does not require an actual physical impairment, but the protection of the Act applies when a person "is regarded [by
others] as having .. . an impairment." 2 ' This provision
was added to the Rehabilitation Act in 1974, Congress
clearly intending the protection of the Act to apply to
a person who is believed by others to be impaired even
if his condition "in fact does not substantially limit
that person's functioning."22 The Supreme Court in
Arline referred to that legislative history and concluded that the Act was intended to apply to protect
a person who had a condition that in itself worked no
impairment but where it "substantially limit[s] that
person's ability to work as a result of the negative
reactions of others to the impairment."2 3
This construction by the Supreme Court of the
statutory definition of the term "individual with handicaps" is particularly relevant to persons who are HIV
positive but asymptomatic. The Court found that, in
order "to combat the effects of erroneous but nevertheless prevalent perceptions about the handicapped,"
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Congress intended by its 1974 amendment to include
within the Act's protection persons who are regarded
by others as handicapped but who "may at present
have no actual incapacity at all."2 4
The Court in Arline stressed that the Act, as
amended in 1974, covers persons "who, as a result [of
being incorrectly regarded as handicapped], are substantially limited in a major life activity."" Thus, the
Supreme Court read the statute to mean what it says:
the perceived impairment need not directly result in
a limitation of a major life activity, so long as it has
the indirect effect, due to the misperceptions of others,
of limiting a life activity. There can be no doubt that
this applies to someone who is HIV positive, although
asymptomatic. And that has been the determination
of at least two lower courts.2 6
The next question that must be addressed is the
requirement of Section 504 of the 1973 Act that, for a
person to come under the protection of the Act, he
must be "otherwise qualified." Thus, for an individual
with handicaps to have the protection of the Act, he
must be "able to meet all of a program's requirements
in spite of his handicap. "27
The Court in Arline referred to the statutory "goal
of protecting handicapped individuals from deprivations based on prejudice, stereotypes, or unfounded
fear, while giving appropriate weight to such legitimate concerns . .. as avoiding exposing others to sig-

nificant health and safety risks . . .."28 To assess
whether "a person handicapped with a contagious
disease" is prevented by that disease from being "otherwise qualified," the Supreme Court adopted a fourpart analysis suggested by the American Medical Association:"
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(b) the duration of the risk (how long is the
carrier infectious),
(c) the severity of the risk (what is the potential
harm to third parties),
(d) the probabilities the disease will be transmitted and will cause varying degrees of harm.
Once this analysis is complete, the Court stated, one
must determine whether the employer (and presumably all others who have duties under the 1973 Act)
can "reasonably accommodate" the handicapped employee if that is possible without "undue financial and
administrative burdens" or without requiring "a fundamental alteration in the nature of [the] program."so
Thus, the Court concluded, "a person who poses
a significant risk of communicating an infectious disease to others in the workplace will not be otherwise
qualified for his or her job if reasonable accommodation will not eliminate that risk."' Under this analysis, it is clear that a person infected with HIV will not
be "otherwise qualified" where there is a significant
risk of transmitting the virus to others. But it is also
clear that a person infected with HIV will be "otherwise qualified" if there is no significant risk of trans-
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mitting the virus to others. The only exception to that
statement is in the case of a person who, because of
the HIV virus, may suffer a dementia attack and is in
a position especially dangerous to others.32
This construction by the Supreme Court in Arline
was not altered by the Harkin-Humphreys amendment of 1988. That amendment excludes from the
Act's protection
an individual who has a currently contagious disease or infection and who, by reason of such
disease or infection, would constitute a direct
threat to the health or safety of other individuals
or who, by reason of the currently contagious
disease or infection, is unable to perform the duties of the job.
The legislative history is clear that Congress intended
to place into the statute the Arline requirement of
reasonable accommodation in determining whether a
person is otherwise qualified." Even the opponents
agreed that this was the intent of the amendment."
I, therefore, conclude that the Rehabilitation Act
provides duties only to employers or other persons
who receive federal funds, which includes medicare
and medicaid reimbursements but does not include
the enrollment of students who receive federal loans
or federally insured loans. Furthermore, the Act provides protection to a person infected with HIV,
whether or not he or she is symptomatic, assuming, of
course, that that person is otherwise qualified. In
determining whether an HIV-infected person is otherwise qualified, the program must consider whether
the person infected would cause a direct threat of
infection to others, and, if so, whether a reasonable
accommodation of that person can be made so as to
permit that person to continue in his job or education
without being that direct threat.
2. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. The
ADA extends the impact of what already was lawthe Rehabilitation Act of 1973-virtually to all employment and public accommodations, whether or not
the entity receives federal funding. This is the Act's
principal change as far as the present inquiry is concerned. It makes no change to the definition of an
"individual with a disability" developed above."
However, it should be noted that, in the ADA,
Congress again makes a strong and clear statement
that it is national policy to eliminate discrimination
against the handicapped:
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination
against individuals with disabilities;
(3) to ensure that the federal government
plays a central role in enforcing the standards
established in this chapter on behalf of individuals
with disabilities; and

(4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment and to regulate commerce, in
order to address the major areas of discrimination
faced day to day by people with disabilities.37
It should also be noted that the Act does not go
into effect until July 1992 for employers who have 25
or more employees and until July 1994 for employers
who have 15 to 25 employees. The public accommodations section does not go into effect until January
1992. Thus, the ADA has no application to a pending
controversy, though it must be considered in reflecting
upon national policy and in drafting policy for future
application.
The ADA makes no change in the definition of an
"individual with handicaps." As concerns employment
of individuals with handicaps, the ADA expressly puts
into statutory law the "reasonable accommodation"
concept that Arline read into the Rehabilitation Act."
The ADA also makes explicit, in banning discrimination against an individual with handicaps in public
accommodations, that the following are public accommodations for this purpose:
(F) ... professional office of a health care provider, hospital, or other service establishment;
(J) a nursery, elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or post graduate private school, or other
place of education . . . .3
Thus, there is no doubt that, as far as students (or
patients) are concerned, a school to educate or train
health-care providers, including acupuncturists, and a
clinic for the practice of any health care, including
acupuncture, will be covered under the ADA public
accommodation provisions, as of January 1992, regardless of its number of employees.
The general rule concerning public accommodations is:
No individual shall be discriminated against
on the basis of disability in the full and equal
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place
of public accommodation by any person who owns,
leases (or leases to) or operates a place of public
accommodation.40
The Act prohibits (a) denying an individual on
the basis of a disability "of the opportunity ... to

participate in or benefit from the goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations,"
or (b) providing that opportunity on a basis "not equal
to that afforded to others," or (c) providing that individual with a benefit "different or separate from that
provided to other individuals, unless such action is
necessary to provide" the handicapped individual with
an "opportunity that is as effective as that provided
to others."4 1
There are two specific provisions that are pertinent here. First, the Act provides that discrimination
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in public accommodation includes
(i) "application of eligibility criteria that
screen out or tend to screen out an individual with
a disability," or
(ii) "a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when
such modifications are necessary to afford such
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages,
or accommodations to individuals with disabilities," or
(iii) "a failure to take such steps as may be
necessary to ensure that no individual with a
disability is excluded, denied services, segregated
or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids
and services"
in each case unless such criteria, modifications or
steps "can be shown to be necessary for the provision
of'" or "would fundamentally alter the nature of the
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations," or, solely in the case of (iii) "would
result in an undue burden . . . "4 2
Second, the Act provides explicitly:
Nothing in this subchapter shall require an
entity to permit an individual to participate in or
benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages and accommodations of such
entity where such individual poses a direct threat
to the health or safety of others. The term "direct
threat" means a significant risk to the health or
safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a
modification of policies, practices, or procedures
or by the provision of auxiliary aids or services. 43
In sum, the ADA will extend the federal prohibitions making illegal discrimination of persons with
disabilities. The employment provisions will apply as
of July 1992 to employers of 25 or more employees
and as of July 1994 to employers of 15 to 25 employees.
The public accommodation provisions will apply as of
January 1992. And there is no doubt that the public
accommodation provisions prohibit discrimination
against students in any health care program, including
those of acupuncture.
Moreover, under the ADA the definition of "individual with handicaps" has not changed, so it continues to encompass those persons who are infected
with HIV. And the employment provisions continue
the concepts of "otherwise qualified" and "reasonable
accommodation," and indeed write them into the very
statute. Finally, there is no doubt that the public
accommodation provisions require reasonable modification of facilities, screening criteria, policies, programs, etc., to accommodate a person with a disability,
as long as that does not "fundamentally alter" the
service being offered, unless "a significant risk to the
health and safety of others" cannot be eliminated even
by such modifications.
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B.State Requirements
Many states have statutes that govern this area.
Maryland is among them. Article 49B of the Maryland
Code prohibits discrimination in public accommodations (Section 8) and in employment (Sections 14-17)
on the basis of "physical or mental handicap." The
term "physical or mental handicap" is defined by
Section 15(g) as:
any physical disability, infirmity, malformation or
disfigurement which is caused by bodily injury,
birth defect or illness including epilepsy, and
which shall include, but not be limited to, any
degree of paralysis, amputation, lack of physical
coordination, blindness or visual impairment,
deafness or hearing impairment, muteness or
speech impediment or physical reliance on a
seeing eye dog, wheelchair, or other remedial appliance or device; and any mental impairment or
deficiency as, but not limited to, retardation or
such other which may have necessitated remedial
or special education or related services.
The Maryland Commission on Human Relations,
which has the authority to enforce this statute, has
redefined the term "physical or mental handicap" to
include specifically "infection with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus ....

"4

Furthermore, the com-

mission regulations contain an "explanation" that the
term "handicap" applies not only to a person who is,
in fact, handicapped, but also to a person who
is regarded as having such a handicap. This refers
to those individuals who are perceived as having
a handicap, whether an impairment exists or not,
but who are regarded as handicapped by persons
who have or may have an effect on the individual's
securing housing or public accommodations, or
securing, retaining, or advancing in employment,
or all of these."
The Commission also provides that "an employer
must attempt to make a reasonable accommodation
to" the handicap, "unless the employer can demonstrate that this accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the employer's business," considering
the size of the business, the type of business, and the
nature and cost of the accommodation needed.46
The prohibition against discrimination in public
accommodations is limited to those persons, businesses, corporations, etc., which are licensed or regulated by the Maryland Department of Licensing and
Regulation (Art. 49B, Sec. 8). The Human Rights
Commission requires that "reasonable accommodation for the needs of the handicapped be undertaken,"
with a list of physical changes given as illustrative."
No court cases under this statute have been found.

C. Howard County Requirements
Howard County has enacted an ordinance: the
Human Rights subtitle of the Health and Social Serv-
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ices title of the Howard County Code." This subtitle
provides in its policy statement:
The Howard County Government shall foster and
encourage the growth and development of Howard
County so that all persons shall have an equal
opportunity to pursue their lives free of discrimination.
This statement continues: "Discrimination practices

toward employment, rather than clinical training as a
part of an educational program. If the ordinance did
apply to clinical training, then the only apparently
relevant provision makes unlawful discrimination
which "limits, segregates, classifies or assigns employees." However, there is also a provision which exempts
from being unlawful "bona fide occupational qualifi-

based upon ... Physical or mental handicap ... [are]

prise . . . ." Thus, if a clinical student is an "employee"

contrary to the public policy of Howard County.""
The term "physical or mental handicap" is defined as
"a physical or mental condition" which:
(a) Substantially limits one or more of a person's
major life activities;
(b) Is historically a part of the person's record; or
(c) Is regarded as an impairment."
Thus, the policy of Howard County is clear. And
in a decision rendered October 4, 1990, the Howard
County Human Rights Commission held that the condition of being HIV positive is a handicap within the
meaning of this ordinance.'
Therefore, any discrimination in Howard County
against a person who is HIV positive would violate
the ordinance-as long as it comes within the ordinance.
However, this is not the end of the consideration.
A reading of the ordinance finds that it applies to the
following situations:
(a) Sec. 12.207. Unlawful housing practices.
(b) Sec. 12.208. Unlawful employment practices.
(c) Sec. 12.209. Unlawful law enforcement practices.
(d) Sec. 12.210. Unlawful public accommodations
practices.
(e) Sec. 12.211. Unlawful financing practices.
There is nothing by which the ordinance applies expressly to educational institutions, except in their role
as an employer or as they furnish housing, or in their
public accommodation role, as a clinic would be to
patients who are members of the public.
There are two possible arguments that might be
made for the application of the ordinance. First, it
might be argued that a clinician is an "employee"
within the meaning of the employment practices section. The term "employee" is defined, quite unhelpfully for our purposes, as "an individual employed by
an employer." The only mention of educational institutions is to exempt from the requirements of the
ordinance educational institutions "in hiring and employing persons of a particular religion if the school,
college or educational institution is ... owned, supported, controlled or managed ... by a particular

church, synagogue, or other religious organization .....

The entire tenor of the provisions concerning
employment appears to contemplate its application to
traditional employment situations, or apprenticeships
34

cations ... reasonable, necessary and relevant to the

normal operation of the particular business or enterwithin the meaning of this Section of the ordinance,
the issue would be begged as to whether particular
requirements applicable to HIV positive clinical students are "bona fide occupational qualifications."
The second argument that might be made is that
the college is a "public accommodation vis a vis its
students, in that it "holds itself out as inviting the
public to utilize its ... services" when it advertises or

otherwise holds itself out to persons to apply for
admission. The Howard County Human Rights Commission has taken an expansive view of what is public
accommodations. In the commission decision cited
above, the complainant had called the Howard County
Medical Society Physician Referral Service, advising
a Ms. Davis, the Secretary of the Medical Society and
the person who answered the telephone, that he, the
caller, was infected with HIV and that he sought a
referral to a local physician for routine and emergency
care (as distinct from treatment for his HIV infection,
for which he already had a physician). Ms. Davis
advised the caller that "none of the[] physicians [on
the referral list] would accept an HIV positive patient." The commission held that the physician referral service is a "public accommodation" within the
meaning of the ordinance:
[T] he Panel finds that the spirit of the law is that
services that are offered and made available to the
public whether or not for profit should operate in
a non-discriminatory fashion. In today's society,
a number of services are provided by telephone
and, therefore, it is believed that a "place" does
encompass a more expansive definition than a
mere physical location and does include telephonic
communications particularly as in this case where
the caller and receiver are both located in Howard
County. The Panel further finds that this expansive definition is in keeping with the broad public
policy of eradicating discrimination from our society. Additionally, the history of anti-discrimination legislation appears to have been one of
constantly expanding coverage.
From this decision, it must be concluded that it
would not at all be surprising for the commission to
hold, as well, that "education" offered in Howard
County to members of the public who are invited to
apply for admission falls within the "public accommodation" provision of the ordinance. To be clear, it
is not at all certain that the Commission would arrive
at this conclusion, nor that a court, upon appeal from
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such a holding, would uphold it. But is is also not at
all clear that "education" would be deemed excluded
from the ordinance as it now reads.
It should also be noted that there is no provision
in the public accommodation section of the ordinance
that is equivalent to the provision in the employment
section exempting "bona fide occupational qualifications ... reasonable, necessary and relevant to the

normal operation of the particular business or enterprise ... ." It is to be hoped that the commission and
the courts will read into the public accommodations
section a reasonableness standard. For example, it
would be reasonable for an acupuncture school to
determine that a person who has no fingers and, thus,
is unable to hold a needle, or a person who has
Parkinson's disease and hence cannot stop from shaking, would not be eligible to enter the educational
program leading to the practice of acupuncture. If that
is accepted, then the college is left with the identical
question in the present matter: whether requirements
specifically applicable to an HIV positive student are
restrictions that are reasonable under the circumstances of that condition.

D.Reasonable Accommodation
No matter the language that is used, should any
of these statutory requirements apply to the college,
the issue becomes whether (a) requirements that are
placed on an HIV positive student are bona fide and
reasonable accommodations to the handicap of that
student, and (b) no accommodation of the handicap is
reasonable in that it does not remove the threat to the
health and safety of others or, if it does, it would
render a fundamental change in the mission of the
college. To answer these questions, other values need
to be considered: the interests of the patient, the
interest of the educational institution, and the known
risks of transmission or other relevant danger. We
will return to the issue of reasonable accommodation
after these values are developed.

II. Informed Consent: The Rights of the Patient
The discussion to this point has centered on the
rights of the individual with handicaps, with a particular focus upon a person whose handicap is an HIV
infection. The factual situation in which this matter
arises, however, requires a focus upon the HIV positive
person who is a health care provider and who practices
a health care procedure upon a patient. This begs the
issue of what rights the patient may have in this
situation.
The patient's rights can best be examined in terms
of a court-developed doctrine called informed consent.
An examination of that doctrine and the values behind
it are important to this analysis.
A fundamental principle of American jurisprudence, in the words of then Judge Cardozo, is that
"every human being of adult years and sound mind
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has a right to determine what shall be done with his
own body."52 From this root principle flows "the universally recognized rule that a physician, treating a
mentally competent adult under nonemergency circumstances, cannot properly undertake to perform
surgery or administer other therapy without the prior
consent of his patient."" Further, "it is the prerogative
of the patient, not the physician, to determine for
himself the direction in which his interests seem to
lie.""
For there to be consent, in any real sense, the
patient must be informed: "To enable the patient to
chart his course understandably, some familiarity with
the therapeutic alternatives and their hazards becomes essential."55
[I]t is evident that it is normally impossible to
obtain a consent worthy of the name unless the
physician first elucidates the options and the perils for the patient's edification. Thus the physician
has long borne a duty, on pain of liability for
unauthorized treatment, to make adequate disclosure to the patient.
As the Maryland Court of Appeals put it in Sard v.
Hardy, "for the patient's consent to be effective, it
must have been an 'informed' consent, one that is
given after the patient has received a fair and reasonable explanation of the contemplated treatment or
procedure."
These statments, of course, beg the question of
how much the health practitioner must disclose. Sard
provides a general principle:
This duty to disclose is said to require a physician to reveal to his patient the nature of the
ailment, the nature of the proposed treatment, the
probability of success of the contemplated therapy
and its alternatives, and the risk of unfortunate consequences associated with such treatment. [58] . . . The law does not allow a physician

to substitute his judgment for that of the patient
in the matter of consent to treatment.
Up to this point, there is general agreement among
the courts. But there are important elements of informed consent on which there is no agreement. For
our purposes, chief among those points of disagreement is whether the scope of the health care practitioner's duty to warn is to be measured by (a) what a
careful practitioner believes a patient should know, or
(b) what a prudent patient would need to know in
order to make an intelligent decision.
The difference is profound, for under the careful
practitioner standard, a practitioner is deemed to have
informed if he or she tells the patient whatever other
practitioners tell their patients in similar circumstances. By this rule, the practitioner's obligation to
disclose is a matter committed to professional judgment and discretion.60 "According to this view,
whether a physician has breached his duty to disclose
is determined by what risks a reasonable medical
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practitioner would have disclosed under the same cir-

cumstances." 6 1

Under the prudent patient standard, on the other
hand, while what practitioners usually do is of some
relevance, the focus is on the patients and their need
of information:
Any definition of scope in terms purely of a professional standard is at odds with the patient's prerogative to decide on projected therapy himself.
That prerogative, we have said, is at the very
foundation of the duty to disclose, and both the
patient's right to know and the physician's correlative obligation to tell him are diluted to the
extent that its compass is dictated by the medical
profession.
In our view, the patient's right of self-decision
shapes the boundaries of the duty to reveal ....
The scope of the physician's communications to
the patient, then, must be measured by the patient's need, and that need is the information
material to the decision.62
Maryland has adopted the prudent-patient standard:
[PIrotection of the patient's fundamental right of
physical self-determination-the very cornerstone of the informed consent doctrine-mandates that the scope of a physician's duty to disclose therapeutic risks and alternatives be governed by the patient's informational needs. Thus,
the appropriate test is not what the physician in
the exercise of his medical judgment thinks a
patient should know before acquiescing in the
proposed course of treatment; rather, the focus is
on what data the patient requires in order to make
an intelligent decision."
The values identified by Maryland as underlying
this standard are two: first, "the protection of the
patient's fundamental right of physical self-determination," and, second, "fundamental fairness":
[Slince the patient must suffer the consequences,
and since he bears all the expenses of the operation and post-operative care, fundamental fairness
requires that the patient be allowed to know what
risks a proposed therapy entails, alternatives
thereto, and the relative probabilities of success.'
Under this standard, "the proper test for measuring
the physician's duty to disclose risk information is
whether such data will be material to the patient's
decision."" The practitioner is to advise the patient
of all material risks of the therapy. "A material risk is
one which a physician knows or ought to know would
be significant to a reasonable person in the patient's
position in deciding whether or not to subject [herself]
to a particular medical treatment or procedure."6 6
If the risk would be intolerable for the reasonably
prudent patient, he or she is entitled to say no, however unwise that assessment of relative risk may be in
the eyes of the health practitioner. And the patient
36

is entitled to all the information concerning the risk
that is material to making that decision. Risks that
are material to that decision depend upon their severity as well as the probability that they would occur."
Professor Gostin of Harvard has concluded, "As the

If the risk would be intolerable for the
reasonably prudent patient, he or she is
entitled to say no, however unwise that
assessment of relative risk may be in the eyes
of the health practitioner.
severity of a potential harm becomes greater the need
to disclose improbable risks grows, though courts have
yet to assign a threshold for the probability of a grave
harm beyond which it must be disclosed."6
The Maryland Court of Appeals, however, has
made clear that a practitioner "is not burdened with
the duty of divulging all risks, but only those which
are material to the intelligent decision of a reasonably
prudent patient."o Furthermore, a practitioner is not
under a duty "to discuss the relatively remote risks
inherent in common procedures, when it is common
knowledge that such risks inherent in the procedure
are of very low incidence."7

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
agrees: "Regardless of the severity of a potential injury, if the probability that the injury will occur is so
small as to be practically nonexistent, then the possibility of that injury occurring cannot be considered
a material factor in a risk assessment. .. ." In the
words of the federal Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit, "risks which are 'possible,' but remote or
unforseeable due to their 'negligible' probability of
occurrence, are immaterial as a matter of law.""
The practitioner, of course, may "withhold information on therapeutic grounds, as in those cases where
a complete and candid disclosure of possible alternatives and consequences might have a detrimental effect on the physical or psychological well-being of the
patient ... .. " Finally, the practitioner's "duty to disclose is suspended where an emergency of such gravity
and urgency exists that it is impractical to obtain the
patient's consent."75
The District of Columbia, in Canterburyv. Spence,
spelled out these requirements in somewhat different
language. First, that court "discard[ed] the thought
that the patient should ask for information before the
physician is required to disclose.. .. Duty to disclose
is more than a call to speak merely on the patient's
request, or merely to answer the patient's questions:
it is a duty to volunteer, if necessary, the information
the patient needs for intelligent decision.""
Ideally, "exposure of a risk would be mandatory
whenever the patient would deem it significant to his
COURTS, HEALTH SCIENCE & THE LAW

decision," but basing the law upon such a requirement
would "summon the physician to second-guess the
patient, ... an undue demand upon medical practi-

tioners. . . ." Rather, "liability for nondisclosure is to
be determined on the basis of foresight, not hindsight;"
with the practitioner being bound to divulge "what he
knows or should know to be the patient's informational needs.""
The starting point is with the practitioner, "who
is in position to identify particular dangers.... He
cannot know with complete exactitude what the patient would consider important to his decision, but on
the basis of his medical training and experience he
can sense how the average, reasonable patient expectably would react.""
The test is "not subjective as to either the physician or the patient; it remains objective with due
regard for the patient's informational needs.

.. ."

In

general, the court went on,
A risk is thus material when a reasonable person,
in what the physician knows or should know to be
the patient's position, would be likely to attach
significance to the risk or cluster of risks in deciding whether or not to forego the proposed therapy.79
In getting down to the nitty-gritty, the court stated
that the following topics should be disclosed:
the inherent and potential hazards of the proposed
treatment, the alternatives to that treatment, if
any, and the results likely if the patient remains
untreated. The factors contributing significance
to the dangerousness of a medical technique are,
of course, the incidence of injury and the degree
of the harm threatened. A very small chance of
death or serious disablement may well be significant; a potential disability which dramatically outweighs the potential benefit of the therapy or the
detriments of the existing malady may summon
discussion with the patient.80
Turning to the exception to the informed consent
requirement where the practitioner concludes that
there are therapeutic reasons to withhold information,
the court cautioned that that exception "must be
carefully circumscribed":
The privilege does not accept the paternalistic
notion that the physician may remain silent simply because divulgence might prompt the patient
to forego therapy the physician feels the patient
really needs. That attitude . . . runs counter to the

foundation principle that the patient should and
ordinarily can make the choice for himself.8 '
Thus, we are left with the following: Maryland
requires, with certain extraordinary exceptions, that
the patient consent before a therapeutic procedure is
undertaken. The patient's consent must be informed.
For the patient to give informed consent, he or she
must be informed of all the information "so as to
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enable the patient to make an intelligent and informed
choice about whether or not to undergo" the therapy.82
The focus is not upon what the practitioner's profession usually does, but "on what data the patient requires in order to make an intelligent decision."'
Again and again, the Maryland court states that the
focus is on "the patient's need" for information "material[] ... to the decision of the patient," divulging

each risk "which a physician knows or ought to know
would be significant to a reasonable person in the
patient's position in deciding" whether to undergo that
therapy. And this is not a duty to divulge all risks,
"but only those which are material to the intelligent
decision of a reasonably prudent patient."'
Thus, the practitioner must put him or herself
into the shoes of the "reasonably prudent patient,"
and ask what information, what risks would be material to that patient in deciding whether to go forward
with the therapy. The test is not what the practitioner
knows, or what the practitioner thinks that the patient
ought to know: it is what the "reasonably prudent
patient" needs to know.
The final question that must be asked is whether
the practitioner is obliged to convey to the patient
information about the practitioner, or whether there
is no occasion in which information concerning the
practitioner is necessary for consent to be informed.
This issue came up in a case in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Wachter v.
United States,' a case which involved Maryland law.
In that case, a patient was operated on at Bethesda
Naval Hospital by a surgeon who was hired by the
Navy after having been terminated by two civilian
health centers for incompetence and lack of diligence,
and after having been found unqualified for service in
the Air Force because of reduced vision. A Navy report
later found that this surgeon had an "unacceptably
high" mortality rate while at Bethesda Naval, with a
number of deaths that other surgeons opined were due
to culpable negligence. He was subsequently cashiered
on the ground of dereliction of duty.' The patient
sued on the ground that she had not been informed of
the surgeon's past when she gave her consent to the
surgery. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's conclusion that the unhappy result that the
patient suffered from the surgery in question had
nothing to do with the surgeon's past or even then
present problems; the result was not an unexpected
one from the surgery performed. In reaching this
ruling, the court noted that the patient sued for lack
of sufficient disclosure about the surgeon by either the
surgeon and the hospital. The court stated: "We read
Sard to leave at issue whether revelations of information about one's physician are within the scope of
the duty to disclose as Maryland has chosen to define
it." Of course, in the way that the Wachter court
disposed of the case, it too had no reason to decide
the issue. 7
As far as I have been able to find, there are but
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two reported cases nationally that even consider
whether the "informed consent" duty on the part of
the health care practitioner includes a requirement of
supplying information about him or herself, as distinct
from information about the procedure or therapy and
its risks, that a patient might find significant in deciding to go forward with that procedure or therapy. In a
Kentucky case, Piper v. Menifer," the court stated:
Suppose a physician, knowing that he has an
infectious disease, continues to visit his patients
without apprising them of the fact, and without
proper precautions on his own part, and thus
communicates the disease to one of them? Clearly
the physician thus acting would be guilty of a
breach of duty, and of his implied undertaking to
his patient, which ... would render him liable for

the consequent damage ... .
The suit was by the physician for his fee. The
patient defended on the theory that, when the physician was called to treat the patient, he was asked,
before he came into the house, whether he was also
treating persons ill with smallpox. The physician was
also told that, if he were treating persons with smallpox, the patient would call another physician. The
physician assured the family that he was not treating
persons ill with smallpox. The evidence showed, however, that the physician in fact was treating persons
with smallpox. The patient contracted smallpox from
the physician. The Kentucky Court of Appeals held
that the jury was justified, upon these facts, in not
awarding the physician a judgment for his fee."o In the
second case, Hales v. Pittman," the court held that
the physician had the duty to inform the patient of
his experience, or lack thereof, before the patient was
asked to consent.
The issue, however, is now before the Circuit
Court for the City of Baltimore in a case involving an
HIV positive surgeon, Rossi v. Almaraz & Johns Hopkins Hosp.," before a New Jersey Superior Court in a
case involving an HIV positive surgeon who was permitted to have privileges at a Princeton hospital only
if he advised patients in advance of his HIV infection
and obtained their consent, 93 Estate of Behringer v.
Medical Center, and before a federal district court in
Missouri in a case involving an HIV positive dental
student who was not permitted to complete his clinical
training, Doe v. Washington University."
There is no doubt, however, that many patients
would like to know whether their practitioners are
HIV positive. This is clear from the Rossi suit in
Baltimore. In that situation, Mrs. Rossi had been
operated on by Dr. Almaraz at Johns Hopkins Hospital. Approximately 1 year after the operation, which
was apparently successful, Dr. Almaraz died of AIDS.
The Hospital attempted to contact each patient upon
whom Dr. Almaraz operated, to notify him or her of
the fact that Dr. Almaraz had died of AIDS, and to
offer each a free test for the HIV virus. Mrs. Rossi
took the test and was shown to be negative. Neverthe38

less, she sued for the emotional and psychological
trauma caused by the fear of having contracted an
HIV infection from Dr. Almaraz. Her suit is based on
the theory that she had the right, before giving her
consent to the operation, to be informed of the fact
that Dr. Almaraz was HIV positive so that she could
make an informed decision whether or not to permit
Dr. Almaraz to proceed with the operation. I am
advised that two other similar suits have now been
filed in Baltimore.
This fact is also clear from a recent article, Physicians and Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome,
published in the Journal of the American Medical
Association in 1989.9' That article reports on a survey
of 2,000 persons interviewed throughout the United
States. That report shows that 45% of those interviewed were of the opinion that a physician who was
HIV positive should not be allowed to continue practice, and that 55.7% of those interviewed would switch
physicians if they knew that their physicians were
HIV-infected. Of those interviewed, 79.7% stated that
an HIV-infected physician should notify his or her
patients of that fact. Another 8.2% opined that this
notification should be given if the patient asks. Only
7.9% were of the opinion that a physician need not
inform his or her patient, even if asked.
This survey confirms a 1987 Gallup Poll, which
found that 86% of those questioned opined that patients should be told if their physicians were HIV
positive.96 And these surveys were undertaken before
there was knowledge, now widespread in the press,
that one, and possibly five, patients probably have
been infected with HIV by an HIV positive dentist in
Florida.
As has been developed above, in Maryland, as now
in about half of the states and the District of Columbia, the standard of the duty that a practitioner has
to inform a patient before that patient gives his or her
consent to a procedure or therapy is what the "reasonably prudent patient" would need to know to make an
intelligent and informed decision. While, in our system, it is a judge who instructs a jury on the law, it
must be kept in mind that it is a jury of laypersons
who will ultimately decide whether the patient has
been told enough to exercise his right of self-determination in whether and how his body should be
treated."

Ill. Otherwise Qualified: Reasonable
Accommodation
As was developed above, the right of an individual
with a handicap to be treated equally to other persons
depends upon whether that individual is "otherwise
qualified," and generally there is a requirement that
"reasonable accommodation" be made so that, as far
as is possible, that individual can enjoy all of the
benefits enjoyed by others. These requirements are
differently stated in the 1973 Rehabilitation Act, in
the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act, in the MaryCOURTS, HEALTH SCIENCE & THE LAW

land statute, in the Howard County ordinance, and in
the regulations implementing those various statutes;
but by and large the requirement of each is quite
similar.
Any development of this requirement must start
with the Supreme Court's decision in School Board of
Nassau County v. Arline." There, the Court made
clear the statutory "goal of protecting handicapped
individuals from deprivations based on prejudice, stereotypes, or unfounded fear, while giving appropriate
weight to such legitimate concerns ... as avoiding

exposing others to significant health and safety
risks

..

.. "9

Applying the Court's four-part analysis (see
above, p. 31, text at n. 29) to assess whether "a person
handicapped with a contagious disease" is prevented
by that disease from being "otherwise qualified" to the
case of an acupuncture practitioner or clinician, we
find the following:
(a) The Nature of the Risk (How the Disease is
Transmitted). There is little or no doubt today
that an HIV infection is transmitted by the blood
or semen of an infected person directly mixing
with blood or semen of another or passing perinatally from an infected mother to her fetus. Thus,
if a health care practitioner is HIV positive, for
the disease to be transmitted from him or her to
a patient, his or her blood or semen must enter
directly into an opening of the patient and contact
directly the patient's blood or mucosal membrane.
(b) The Duration of the Risk (How Long is the
Carrier Infectious). By every bit of evidence available today, once a person is infected, he or she
remains a carrier for life.
(c) The Severity of the Risk (What is the Potential
Harm to Third Parties). Based upon current
knowledge and technology, death is to be expected
in every case.
(d) The Probabilities the Disease Will Be Transmitted and Will Cause Varying Degrees of Harm.
Assuming that universal precautions are taken,
the risk of transmittal from the practitioner or
clinician to the patient is as close to nonexistant
as one can imagine. This statement needs some
development.
The law does not say that for an individual to be
"otherwise qualified" there must be no risk at all.
Rather, the risk that would permit a decision that an
individual is not "otherwise qualified" must be a "significant risk." The Supreme Court in Arline made it
clear that the goal of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act is to
"protect[] handicapped individuals from deprivations
based on prejudice, stereotypes, or unfounded fear,
while giving appropriate weight to such legitimate
concerns as avoiding exposing others to significant
health and safety risks."' The Court went on:
A person who poses a significant risk of communicating an infectious disease to others in the
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workplace will not be otherwise qualified for his
or her job if reasonable accommodation will not
eliminate that risk.' 0'
The lower courts have ruled that a remote risk of
acquiring AIDS is not sufficient to justify discrimination.102
The standard of "significant risk" under the current law is not altered under the new Americans with
Disabilities Act. Indeed, the legislative history of the
ADA reflects the intent of Congress that the "significant risk" standard not be watered down in its application or interpretation. Indeed, it is clear that the
intent of Congress is that "speculative or remote risk"
or "merely elevated risk" is not to be considered "significant risk" and does not justify discriminaiion.' 03
First, it should be recognized that scientific evaluation of the evidence available concerning the HIV
has established
only transmission by blood, semen, and vaginal
secretions. Whether transmission occurs may depend upon the concentration of virus in the fluid.
People have been severely bitten by AIDS patients
and still not contracted the disease. Mouth-tomouth resuscitation also has failed to cause transmission. Studies of persons living with AIDS patients have shown that causal interaction does not
transmit the disease. Sexual activity, intravenous
drug use, and birthing may transmit the HIV
virus ....

[T]he blood of the doctor or student

must spill in an operative site, area of inflammation or open wound to create any risk of spreading
HIV to the patient.'04
Turning now to the college and its adjunct clinic,
it is clear that disposable needles are used, except in
unusual instances (and then never by students without
at hand supervision), in which case the needles are
sterilized in an autoclave before reuse. There is no
doubt that the autoclave, used properly, sterilizes
needles well enough to remove the AIDS virus along
with other viruses and bacteria that can result in
infection. The clinic and college do not permit a needle
to be used on more than one person, and the students
are so instructed. Thus, should a student or practitioner inadvertently stab him or herself with a needle,
that needle, if disposable, should immediately be put
into the container for disposal, and, if not disposable,
should immediately be put into the container for sterilization in an autoclave.
Moreover, if a practitioner or clinician has any
open lesions or weeping dermititis, generally accepted
precautions require that those lesions be covered completely by a bandage or bandaid, and if that is not
possible, that the practitioner or clinician refrain from
direct patient contact until the condition of the practitioner or clinician improves to the point where there
are no open lesions or weeping dermititis that cannot
be completely contained by bandaging. This prevents
any blood or other bodily fluid from leaving the prac39

titioner or clinician and entering into a patient
through some opening in the patient's skin.
With these universal precautions, the chance of
transmission of the HIV-or the hepatitis B virus,
which is transmitted similarly and, by all indications,
more easily-from the practitioner or the clinician to
the patient is practically nonexistent.
The only possibility of transmission from practitioner to the patient is the situation in which the
infected practitioner pricks himself with the needle
without being aware of that fact, drawing his or her
own blood, which either then remains on the needle
when it is inserted into the patient or dribbles onto
the patient at a point of an open lesion, perhaps the
lesion caused earlier by the insertion of an acupuncture needle. From my inquiries, I am quite certain
that this is not within the realm of the possible in the
situation posed: there is no way that there would not
be feeling in the practitioner should a needle prick to
such a distance under the skin as to draw blood.
Moreover, scientific inquiry has established that "a
small inoculum of contaminated blood is unlikely to
transmit the virus." 05
Indeed, survey after survey has shown that the
risk of transmission in a much more dangerous situation than is posed by acupuncture is extremely small.
A surgeon, or a dentist, has his or her fingers or hands
in an open cavity of the patient, with the patient's
blood flowing and with the immediate presence of
sharp instruments on which the surgeon or dentist
may cut him or herself, thus releasing the practitioner's blood to mingle with the blood of the patient.
Surgeons have advised this author that cuts and nicks
in surgical gloves are to be expected during any extensive operation. Indeed, one neurosurgeon advised this
author that he expects to have his gloves cut, and need
replacement, on the average of once every half hour
to an hour, and that about a third of the time the cut
goes through the glove to his skin. Professor Gostin
cited studies that indicate "a surgeon will cut a glove
in approximately one out of every four cases, and
probably sustain a significant skin cut in one of every
forty cases."1o

There have been several cases reported of HIV
positive surgeons and dentists. On several occasions,
surveys and tests have been conducted of the former
patients of those surgeons and dentists. Surveys and
tests of literally thousands of such patients have now
been made. The result is that in only one instance has
transmission of HIV infection from a single dentist to
a patient been confirmed as a probability, with four
other cases of transmission from the same dentist
suspected. Even those cases are disputed by qualified
scientists, who say that the evidence is far from
clear.'0o
The difference between the surgeon and the dentist on the one hand and the acupuncturist on the
other is profound: while the surgeon or the dentist has
his or her fingers or hand inside a patient's cavity,
where there are sharp instruments on which the sur40

geon or dentist can be cut, permitting the blood of the
surgeon or dentist to mingle with that of the patient,
that is just not true with an acupuncturist. The acupuncturist does not practice inside a cavity of a patient. Nor are there sharp instruments on which the
acupuncturist can cut him or herself and spread blood
from the acupuncturist to mingle with blood of the
patient. The acupuncturist should not puncture himself. But if he or she should do so accidentally, the
acupuncturist is not situated over an open, bleeding
cavity of the patient. And, of course, using generally
accepted precautions, the acupuncturist should not
use on the patient a needle that accidentally or otherwise punctured the acupuncturist or anyone else.
Thus, to return to the Arline analysis: there is no
risk of transmission from the acupuncturist or the
clinician to the patient. Any risk is, at best, remote
and speculative. Clearly, it does not rise to the "significant risk" standard of the law.
This should end the analysis, for it would appear
that federal, state, and county laws would, in this
instance, ensure that the HIV positive practitioner or
student is treated by an employer or a school in the
same manner as any other practitioner or student is
treated-except for the apparent conflict with the
right of the prudent patient to be informed of such
risks as he or she needs in order to make an intelligent
and informed decision, and the evidence that indicates
that most people feel that they should be informed if
their physicians are HIV positive.
There is one other factor as well. At least the
Americans with Disabilities Act contains a qualification that an employer or a school is to make such
modifications of criteria, procedures, practices, etc., to
reasonably accommodate a handicapped individual
unless such modification "would fundamentally alter
the nature of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations" offered by the employer or the school.'
One must approach this "straw" with caution,
however. It is a qualification on the statutory duty to
modify already existing procedures, practices, etc.,
when there is already an "otherwise qualified" handicapped individual and such a modification is necessary
to reasonably accommodate that person's handicap. It
is not framed as an authorization to discriminate
against the handicapped individual in order to prevent
a "fundamental[] alter[ation of] the nature of the
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations" offered by the employer or the
school.
Nevertheless, it constitutes a recognition that the
employer or the school furnishes certain goods, services, etc., and it is asking too much that they should
be fundamentally altered in order to provide for a
handicapped person. Moreover, it is a reminder that
the "otherwise qualified" requirement contemplates
that there will be people who, because of their handicaps, are not qualified.109
An easy, although absurd example is that of the
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quadriplegic who insists on being hired for the professional football or basketball team. In Southeastern
Community College,"o the Supreme Court ruled that
a college could conclude that a hearing-impaired person was not "otherwise qualified" to participate in a
nursing school program because of safety factors. The
Federal Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled
that a law school did not violate the Rehabilitation
Law by expelling a student who suffered from alcohol
addiction after the school gave the student two
chances at rehabilitation."' The Second Circuit ruled
that a medical school could exclude a mentally ill
student because of concerns for safety." 2 And the
Sixth Circuit permitted a school of optometry to discriminate against an individual who had insufficient
dexterity to perform delicate procedures required in
the program."'
Putting the matter into an acupuncture setting, it
could hardly be contended that an acupuncture school
would violate the Rehabilitation Act by failing to
admit an individual who has Parkinson's or some
other disease of palsy that prevents the individual
from holding his or her hand steady, permitting the
insertion of the needle at the point intended. Another
example is that of a person with impaired mental or
psychomotor skills, resulting from AIDS, so that diagnostic or treatment techniques were inhibited."'
Nor would it violate either the Rehabilitation Act or
the ADA to refuse to graduate such a person if the
condition or the severity thereof manifested itself after
matriculation, or, if the condition were apparent upon
admission, should attempts at reasonable accommodation have failed.
This factor begs the next question: what is it about
the fact that the college is a school of higher education,
and particularly an acupuncture school, that should
be considered in the equation. Particular focus should
be given to the essential philosophical basis of traditional acupuncture that each person is responsible for
his or her body, mind, and spirit, to keep each of those
well and in balance, and to remedy for him or herself
any imbalance or disease that may occur, with the
practitioner being only a helper along the way. This,
of course, brings into the same focus the "prudent
patient" concepts of the Maryland informed consent
requirement.

IV. Academic Freedom
If we were dealing solely with a practitioner who
was faced with hiring a young associate, the issue
would be difficult but still only between the statutory
restrictions on discrimination against the handicapped, on the one hand, and the right of a patient to
be fully informed in giving his or her consent to a
procedure or therapy that involves his or her body.
But here we have a third factor to consider: the
academy. The college is a school of higher education,
authorized by the state to bestow a Master's degree.
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And the academy has certain freedom and rights recognized within our law. Justice Felix Frankfurter, in
a pivotal Supreme Court concurrence, presented
four essential freedoms of the university-to determine for itself on academic grounds who may
teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught,
and who may be admitted to study."'
While the concept of academic freedom originated
in a struggle for the freedom of faculty members
against administrators and lay boards," 6 it has
emerged as a constitutional doctrine as the freedom
of the academy against governmental interference.
The constitutional doctrine of academic freedom was
born in the McCarthy era, when the courts on many
occasions stood as bulwarks against governmental attempts to weed out of the universities persons with
views that were then unpopular.
The story begins with Sweezy v. New Hampshire.
Professor Sweezy was found in contempt for failure to
answer questions concerning the content of his teaching posed by the New Hampshire Attorney General in
a McCarthy-type inquisition.
The plurality opinion, written by Chief Justice
Warren, reversed on grounds other than academic
freedom. Chief Justice Warren noted that academic
freedom was a consideration in the case, stating, "The
essentiality of freedom in the community of American
universities is almost self-evident." He went on to
declare: "We do not now conceive of any circumstance
wherein a state interest would justify infringement of
rights in these fields." 7"
In his concurrence, Justice Frankfurter spoke of
"the dependence of a free society on free universities.
This means the exclusion of governmental interven-.
tion in the intellectual life of a university.""
The Court returned to this theme 10 years later
when, in Kayishian v. Board of Regents,"' it struck
down a New York McCarthy-era law designed to ferret
out hidden "subversives" from New York universities.
Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court, declared:
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding
academic freedom, which is of transcendent value
to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not
tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the
classroom. "The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the
community of American schools." The classroom
is peculiarly the "marketplace of ideas." The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through
wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas
which discovers truth "out of a multitude of
tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection." 2 0
With this as seminal constitutional doctrine, the
Court has gone on to give some content to the freedom
of the academy that is directly pertinent to our prob41

lem. In his controlling opinion in Regents of California
v. Bakke,'21 Justice Powell recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act prohibited any state instrumentality from penalizing any
applicant because of his race. But, relying on Justice
Frankfurter's "four essential freedoms of the University,"1 22 Justice Powell concluded that the First
Amendment right of academic freedom empowers a
state university to take race or national origin into
account in admitting students when doing so in pursuit of the academic goal of a diverse student body.12 3
"The atmosphere of 'speculation, experimentation and
creation'-so essential to the quality of higher education-is widely believed to be promoted by a diverse
student body."124 Thus, the academy was given the
right to consider race or national origin-as an element of academic freedom-when other segments of
society were more tightly bound not to discriminate.
In two cases, the Supreme Court applied these
principles to situations in which universities dismissed
students. Both involved medical students and judgments made by the faculty that the students should
not continue. In one, Board of Curators, Univ. of
Missouri v. Horowitz,1 25 the student was not permitted
to graduate and was dismissed on an evaluation of her
clinical performance, including her ability to relate
with patients, her personal hygiene, and her erratic
attendance. In the other, Regents of Univ. of Michigan
v. Ewing,12 6 a student had failed a significant examination, which the student was not allowed to retake,
even though all other students who had failed that
examination in the immediate preceding years had
been allowed to retake it, some two and even three
times. The trial court had found that Ewing had been
having academic difficulty since he began the program,
failing other courses, and in other ways had a very
poor record. Both Horowitz and Ewing went to court,
claiming a constitutional liberty and property right in
continuing in her and his education and that the
university had deprived each of that right without due
process. In each case, the court of appeals had ruled
for the student and the Supreme Court reversed.
Significant to our discussion is that the Supreme
Court specifically referred to "a reluctance to trench
on the prerogatives of state and local educational
institutions and our responsibility to safeguard their
academic freedom, 'a special concern of the First
Amendment.'

"127

The Court went on:

Academic freedom thrives not only on the
independent and uninhibited exchange of ideas
among teachers and students,[128] ... but also,

and somewhat inconsistently, on autonomous de-

cisionmaking by the academy itself.[129] ... Dis-

cretion to determine, on academic grounds, who
may be admitted to study, has been described as
one of "the four essential freedoms" of a university. 30
Thus, "when judges are asked to review the substance of a genuinely academic decision, such as this
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one, they should show great respect for the faculty's
professional judgment. Plainly, they may not override
it unless it is such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the
person or committee responsible did not actually exercise academic judgment."s 1 "University faculties
must have the widest range of discretion in making
judgments as to the academic performance of students
and their entitlement to promotion or graduation."13 2
This principle was recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in University of Pennsylvania v. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission:'"a
[C]ourts have stressed the importance of avoiding
second-guessing of legitimate academic judgments. This Court itself has cautioned that
"judges ... asked to review the substance of a

genuinely academic decision ... should show great
respect for the faculty's professional judgment."[134] ... Nothing we say today should be

understood as a retreat from this principle of
respect for legitimate academic decisionmaking.
This, of course, does not mean that everything the
academy does is free from government interference.
In University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, for example,
the Court rejected the university's argument that academic freedom prohibited the EEOC from requiring
the university to turn over tenure files, including
copies of otherwise confidential evaluations and notes
of deliberations, in an investigation concerning discrimination in tenuring. Nor is the academy free from
barring meetings of student religious groups, when the
campus is open to meetings of other groups,as or of a
student group on the ground that its political views
are unpalatable to the state college.3"' Nor will freedom of the academy protect a faculty member from
having to testify about subversive activities among
graduate students at the university, the court stating
that a university is not a "constitutional sanctuary
from inquiry into matters that may otherwise be
within the constitutional legislative domain. .. ."137
Thus, it is clear that the academy may not refuse
to admit blacks, females, Jews, Catholics, Hispanics,
etc., as students. Nor may the academy refuse to hire
such persons or, once hired, to grant them tenure. But
a decision of whether a particular person should be
hired or tenured, or whether a particular person should
be admitted as a student, dismissed on academic
grounds, or permitted to graduate, comes within the
freedom of the academy as long as the decision is made
upon legitimate academic grounds.
Another area that we may assume is protected by
academic freedom is the qualifications for graduation.
The state, of course, may lay down a minimum hour
requirement for the award of a certain degree. But
what the school wishes to produce in the form of a
lawyer or a botanist or a nurse or a physician, and
whether a particular person meets that requirement,
is up to the academic judgment of the academy. Thus,
a court would not review whether the University of
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Missouri was correct or incorrect in refusing to graduate Ms. Horowitz on the ground that she lacked the
necessary clinical skills of a physician. The University
of Michigan's decision not to allow Mr. Ewing to
retake an exam but, instead, to dismiss him from the
program because, in the judgment of the faculty, his
accumulated record warranted such dismissal, is an
academic judgment not to be reviewed by a court.
Turning now to the field of acupuncture education, it appears from these cases that the academy has
the freedom to determine what makes a good acupuncturist. If the academy decides that a very important ingredient is the rapport, the trust between the
practitioner and the patient, the academy is free to
make the academic decision whether a particular student has the ability and the willingness to create that
rapport and that trust.
Thus, the academy can develop its own view of
what a competent acupuncture practitioner should be,
including all aspects of clinical demeanor and practitioner-patient relationship. Also, the academy may
decide, on sound academic analysis, that a particular
person, for whatever sound academic reason, including
his or her demeanor, hygienic appearance, bedside
manner, respect for others, understanding of universal
safety precautions, and willingness to follow them,
etc., is not capable of being a qualified acupuncturist
no matter how high he or she may score on examinations in didactic courses. This is a part of that freedom
of the academy first presented in Sweezy and Kayishian and then applied to somewhat analogous situations in Horowitz and Ewing.

Of course, as a practical matter, the academy is
not entirely free from the influence of the state and
others. As the state licenses professionals, it may
decide that, for an individual to be licensed, certain
courses must be taken during his or her education.
While that is not a directive to the academy of what
to teach, the failure to teach that which qualifies
graduates for licensure will reduce the willingness of
students to attend that particular academy. The same
influence is exerted by accrediting bodies. But the
choice still remains with the academy of what and
how to teach within those requirements, and, of
course, the academy may always require more than is
required by the state or by accrediting standards.

V. Analysis and Conclusion
A. Values in Conflict
There are three basic values in conflict in the
situation presented:
1. There is a strong public policy, expressed
at all levels of government, that the handicapped
not be discriminated against just because of his or
her handicap, unless that handicap truly disables
the person from doing the task at hand, and even
then only if reasonable accommodation will not
solve the problem posed by the handicap; no emSUMMER 1991, VOL. 2, NO. 1

ployer and no place of public accommodation
should act in accordance with irrational prejudice
toward the handicapped.
2. There is the right of the patient to control
what happens to his or her own body, expressed
as the right of a patient who is not an infant,
incompetent, or unconscious, to have a health care
procedure done to his or her body or a therapy
undertaken only with his or her consent; the
health care practitioner has the duty to inform
the patient fully of any significant risk of which
the patient needs to know in order to make an
intelligent and informed decision.
3. The academy has the freedom to decide,
on sound academic grounds, who should be admitted to study, what he or she should be taught
from all aspects of the discipline, and who is
qualified to be promoted and eventually to graduate.
The conflict concerning the handicapped and the
patient may be expressed as follows: the law prohibits
the employer and the entity that offers public accommodation to discriminate without rational reason, and
even then only where reasonable accommodation is
not possible. But the customer is permitted to discriminate, no matter how irrationally. Thus, while the
retail establishment cannot keep out a customer because he or she is black, Hispanic, oriental, Jewish, or
Baptist, or is in a wheelchair, the customer can decide
to avoid any retail establishment that is owned by, or
employs, a black, an hispanic, an oriental, a Jew, a
Baptist, or a person in a wheelchair. Likewise, while
a school cannot refuse admission to someone because
he is black, hispanic, oriental, Jewish, or Baptist, the
black student can decide to go only to a black school;
the Jew can decide to go only to a Jewish school; and
the Baptist can decide to go only to a Baptist school.
The same is true, of course, in the health care
business: a health care professional cannot refuse to
serve someone because he is black or oriental or Jewish
or Baptist or female. But the patient can choose not
to patronize (or to go only to) a black or oriental or
Jewish or Baptist or female practitioner.
Putting this analysis in terms of HIV positivity:
an employer cannot refuse to employ (and cannot fire)
an employee who is HIV positive who is "otherwise
qualified." That is true of a health care practitioner
who employs others. But a patient can refuse to be
treated in the office or clinic of a health care practitioner who employs anyone who is HIV positive,
whether or not he or she is "otherwise qualified."
Thus, a patient may ask of his or her practitioner: are
you HIV positive? If the answer is yes, or if the
practitioner refuses to answer the question, the patient
has the right not to consent to the treatment-no
matter how irrationally the patient is acting, for there
is no law that permits a patient, as a customer, to
discriminate against a person handicapped by HIV
infection only for rational reasons.
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B. The Policy of Others
This issue, of course, is not exclusive to acupuncture. It is one with which both the medical and the
dental professions have been grappling. The Centers
for Disease Control in 1987 issued the following guideline:
The question of whether workers infected
with HIV-especially those who perform invasive
procedures-can adequately and safely be allowed
to perform patient care duties or whether their
work assignments should be changed must be
determined on an individual basis. These decisions should be made by the health care worker's
personal physician(s) in conjunction with the
medical directors and personnel health service
staff of the employing institution or hospital.13 8
The CDC defined the term "invasive procedure"
rather strictly, as
surgical entry into tissues, cavities, or organs or
repair of major traumatic injuries (1) in an operating or delivery room, emergency department, or
outpatient setting, including both physicians' and
dentists' offices; (2) cardiac catheterization and
angiographic procedures; (3) a vaginal or cesarean
delivery or other invasive obstetric procedure during which bleeding may occur; or (4) the manipulation, cutting, or removal of any oral or perioral
tissues, including tooth structure, during which
bleeding occurs or the potential for bleeding exists. 39
The Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the
American Medical Association in 1988 issued an opinion that:
A physician who knows that he or she has an
infectious disease should not engage in any activity that creates a risk of transmission of the disease to others ....

The Council ... reiterates and reaffirms the

AMA's strong belief that AIDS victims and those
who are seropositive should not be treated unfairly
or suffer from discrimination. However, in the
special context of the provision of medical care,
the Council believes that, if a risk of transmission
of an infectious disease from a physician to a
patient exists, disclosure of that risk to patients
is not enough; patients are entitled to expect that
their physicians will not increase their exposure
to the risk of contracting an infectious disease,
even minimally. If no risk does exist, disclosure of
the physician's medical condition to his or her
patients will serve no rational purpose; if a risk
does exist, the physician should not engage in the
activity .... There may be an occasion when a
patient who is fully informed of the physician's
condition and the risks that condition presents
may choose to continue his or her care with the
seropositive physician. Great care must be exer-
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cised to ensure that true informed consent is obtained.140
The American Medical Association itself, in January 1991, after the Centers for Disease Control announced that there was strong evidence that HIV
infection had been transmitted from a dentist to one
and possibly five patients, issued a strong statement:
The health of patients must always be the paramount concern of physicians. Consequently, until
the uncertainty about transmission is resolved,
the American Medical Association believes that
HIV infected physicians should either abstain
from performing invasive procedures which pose
an identifiable risk of transmission or disclose
their sero-positive status prior to performing a
procedure and proceed only if there is informed
consent.1 4 1
The American Dental Association issued a similar
statement on January 16, 1991:
Currently, there is no scientific evidence to indicate that HIV-positive healthcare providers pose
an identifiable risk of HIV transmission to their
patients. There has been only one documented
case of transmission from an HIV infected health
care provider to patients during the past ten years
of experience with AIDS, an indication that the
risk is infinitesimal. The ADA continues to believe
that the recommended infection control procedures are effective in preventing transmission of
infection.
However, the recent case of possible HIV transmission from dentist to patient has raised some
uncertainty about the risk of transmission from
healthcare provider to patient. While there is evidence that this dental practice did not consistently
adhere to all recommended guidelines for prevention of disease transmission, the precise mechanism of transmission in this case remains unknown. This uncertainty leads to the conclusion
that the foremost concern of the dental profession
must continue to be protection of the patient.
Thus, unless the uncertainty about transmission
is resolved, the ADA believes that HIV-infected
dentists should refrain from performing invasive
procedures or should disclose their seropositive
status.
The New York State Department of Health also
issued a policy and guidelines statement in January
1991. The New York statement emphasized that,
based on "all available data," the "risk of HIV transmission from infected health care personnel to their
patients" is "extremely low"; the "risk can be described
as remote but cannot be quantified precisely." The
department's conclusion is "that HIV-infected professionals should continue all professional practice for
which they are qualified, with rigorous adherence to
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universal precautions and scientifically accepted infection control practices."
As a general principle, limiting the practice of
HIV-infected health care professionals is not necessary or justified unless there is clear evidence
that such workers pose a significant risk of transmitting infection through an inability to meet
basic infection control standards or unless they
are functionally unable to care for patients.
The department emphasized the importance of adhering to universal barrier techniques to protect both the
health worker and the patient.
The American Association of Medical Colleges has
declared that its institutions may legitimately modify
the clinical activities of students and faculty because
of the "conceivable" risk that transfer of disease may
occur during invasive procedures, but makes no recommendation that they do so.14 2 The American Association of Dental Schools recommends that HIVinfected dentists and students should not engage in
activities that create a risk of transmitting HIV to a
patient, but does not recommend restrictions on HIV
positive faculty or students.143
Largely through the National Association of University and College Attorneys, I have obtained the
statements of four universities. No representation is
made that these statements are inclusive of all that
have been adopted by various universities, or that they
are even representative, only that these were all that
were obtained. As these statements are designed to
guide the conduct of both practitioners and students
at teaching health care facilities, they are instructive
of what these institutions have done.
1. Georgetown University. Based upon the 1987
CDC guidelines, Georgetown's policy is that HIVinfected health care personnel continue to be employed, with a case by case determination to be made
concerning each infected employee. However, no HIVinfected practitioner, employee, or student is to perform "invasive procedures unless such activity is approved by a committee consisting of the person's own
physician, the Hospital Medical Director and the Employee Health Service Medical Director." 144
2. Howard University. No health care worker or student who has oozing lesions or weeping dermatitis,
regardless of infection with AIDS, is allowed to have
direct contact with patients until the condition clears.
Health care workers and students who are HIV-infected and who do not perform invasive procedures
are not restricted unless some other condition requires
such restriction. The work assignment of such a person is considered on an individual basis upon an
assessment of health and safety risks to patients and
to the worker or student.""
3. University of West Virginia. HIV-infected health
care workers and students "must not engage in any
activity that creates a risk of transmission of HIV
infection to others, such as invasive procedures."
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Workers or students "who are not involved in direct
patient care or do not perform invasive procedures do
not pose a risk to patients and should not be restricted
in their activity unless they have other transmissible
infection/s . . . ." (Emphasis added.) Any modification

of the clinical training or privileges of HIV-infected
medical students or staff is determined on a case by
case basis, "taking into account the nature of the
clinical activity, the technical expertise of the infected
person, and the risks posed by HIV carriage, attendant
functional disabilities, and the transmissibility of simultaneously carried infectious agents."' 46
4. University of North Dakota. There is a Significant
Infectious Disease Committee, and any employee or
student who is diagnosed with AIDS may, if he or she
wishes, request from this committee "reasonable accommodation for or workplace restrictions on a faculty or staff member ... [or] reasonable accommoda-

tions or restrictions on the educational programs or
other University activities of a student diagnosed as
having AIDS."l 47

C. Resolution
Once again, it must be recalled that it is the
academy with which we are concerned. Thus, whatever
policy is arrived at should be based primarily upon the
teaching and training mission of the academy. This
policy should be arrived at by a weighing of all of
those academic concerns of this particular academy.
In this case, the college is educating and training
practitioners of traditional acupuncture. The end
product sought is a practitioner who is successful with
patients in the mode that is traditional acupuncture.
This mode is more than the mechanical taking of
pulses and insertion of needles. There is a direct and
personal relationship between practitioner and patient
that goes beyond, and indeed makes meaningful, the
diagnostic techniques and the needling that follows.
The college is entitled to make, and, indeed, has the
responsibility to make, the considered academic judgment as to what is a practitioner of traditional acupuncture, that is, what is the product that the college
aims to produce. The college may sketch out those
elements that, in its considered academic judgment,
goes to make up such an individual. The college may
also decide, upon sound and rational academic
grounds, whether a particular individual possesses
those qualifications that, in its judgment, would make
him or her a good bet to benefit from the education
and training offered by the college and would probably
emerge as the practitioner that the college desired to
produce.
Similarly, the college, at every step of the way
through the educational and training process, may
make the rational academic judgment whether an
individual student has those necessary qualifications
to move on to the next step. When a student, in the
sound academic judgment of the college, does not
possess those qualifications, the college may decide,
and indeed has the responsibility to decide, not to
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permit that student to move forward, even if that
means dropping from the program.
Finally, the college has the duty to make the
rational academic judgment whether a student who

The college isentitled to make, and, indeed,
has the responsibility to make, the considered
academic judgment as to what isa
practitioner of traditional acupuncture.
has come to the completion of the program offered by
the college has emerged with the skills, maturity, and
ability which the college has identified as the practitioner that it is its aim to produce. And when, in the
sound academic judgment of the college, a student
does not measure up to that standard, the college may
determine that that student is not qualified to receive
its degree and to be sent into the world with its
imprimatur.
Thus, in the final analysis, what goes into a qualified student for the purpose of admission, promotion,
and graduation is the responsibility of the college.
And, as long as those decisions are made upon sound
academic grounds, courts will not second guess.
That, of course, does not mean that a school may
decide that no black or no Hispanic or no Jew or no
Baptist could emerge as that school's qualified product. The qualification must be rationally related to the
end result, which, in this case, is an acupuncture
practitioner. There must be some rational connection
between the perceived lack of qualification of the
individual student and the end result sought. Thus, it
would seem to me, an acupuncture school could decide
that sensitivity of fingers of pulses and steadiness of
hand with needling are essential qualifications of an
acupuncturist, and an individual who lacks those abilities could rationally be denied admission, refused
promotion, or restricted from graduation.
Likewise, it is up to the college to decide how
much of a role rapport between patient and practitioner plays in a successful practitioner. Thus, the
college may determine that, within its vision of a
successful practitioner of acupuncture, what may be
called "bedside manner" is of a certain significance
for both diagnostic and treatment purposes. The college may decide what factors it believes goes into the
proper "bedside manner" of a successful practitioner:
perhaps such items as trust, confidence, empathetic
listening, tactful questioning, and communication
skills. The college could then put these factors into its
qualifications for admission, promotion, and graduation, as well as into its curriculum. Just as the University of Missouri could decide in Horowitz that the
student's clinical manner just did not measure up to
what the university expected of its graduate product,
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the college could decide, upon sound academic
grounds, that a particular person should not be admitted, promoted, or graduated because he or she did
not possess enough of those qualities of rapport to be
the kind of practitioner that the college would wish to
send out into the world with its imprimatur.
In short, it is the college that has the freedom and
that bears the responsibility-as the Academy-of
deciding what its teaching shall be and what product
it wishes to produce in the form of practitioners. And
it is the college, as the academy, that has the freedom
and the responsibility of deciding for each student
whether he or she measures up to the college's image
in order to be promoted and ultimately graduated. As
long as those decisions are made on sound academic
grounds in terms of the mission of the college, current
law would uphold the judgment of the college.
In making these decisions, the college must consider the impact on it of the various statutes that
prohibit discrimination against the individuals with
handicaps who are "otherwise qualified." Upon my
inquiries, I have concluded that the current federal
Rehabilitation Act applies to the college. I have been
advised that some federal medicare and/or medicaid.
money has been received. It is unclear whether that
was received by the Acupuncture Center or by the
college, but I expect that it makes no difference. The
two entities, while separate corporations, work together so closely and are so intertwined that it is my
opinion that they will probably be treated as one for
the purposes of the Rehabilitation Act. As that Act
was amended by the Civil Rights Restoration Act of
1988, if any one part of an entity receives federal
funds, all parts of the entity are covered by the Rehabilitation Act and other federal civil rights acts.
There is, of course, no doubt that the college will be
covered under the new Americans with Disabilities
Act as of January 1992.
On the state level, the picture is not as clear. If
the college, as a school, is considered solely as a public
accommodation, it comes within the Maryland legislation only if it is licensed or regulated by the Maryland Department of Licensing and Regulation. I am
advised by officials of the college that they are aware
of no licensing or regulation by the Department of
Licensing and Regulation, but that the college is approved and regulated solely by the Board of Higher
Education. Assuming the accuracy of that fact, the
Maryland statute does not apply-as far as the college
is to be considered a public accommodation. But, as
far as the college is an employer, it is covered by the
state act. And it is at least arguable that a clinician,
who earns fees for the college, is to be considered an
employee for at least some purposes. As the matter is
not clear, it cannot be stated with certainty that the
state act has no application to the.college.
On the other hand, the Howard County ordinance
is written broadly enough that I expect there will be
little trouble in applying it to the college.
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Whatever application the statutory commands
may have in making these decisions in terms of persons who are handicapped, by HIV infection or otherwise, I urge that the college take into serious consideration the national public policy to do away with
irrational prejudices and stereotyping of those who
are handicapped. Thus, I urge that very serious consideration be given to whether a person who is handicapped is "otherwise qualified" to be a traditional
acupuncturist or whether his or her handicap stands
in the way of that individual becoming a successful
acupuncturist within the college's vision of such a
person. If the college, in its sound academic judgment,
believes that the individual is not qualified because of
his or her handicap, then I urge that the college
consider every possibility of a reasonable accommodation that would make that individual qualified: perhaps extra help, extra supervision, or extra barrier
protection. Only if the college, upon sound academic
grounds, concludes that no reasonable accommodation
can be made without destroying the vision or the
standards of the college, or without expense unreasonable for the college to bear, should the college further
conclude that that student should not be promoted or
graduated.
Furthermore, I urge that the college consider maximum protection of the patient from infection and
ensure that every step possible be taken to prevent
the spread of infection from the practitioner or clinician to the patient. Thus, every element of the universal precautions, and other precautions that appear
to be appropriate to the college's particular situation,
should be taken. These elements should be clearly
spelled out in the teaching of the college and in the
handbooks for both practitioner and clinician. They
should be looked for by all supervisors, and considered
in all evaluations. If, in the considered academic judgment of the college, some further precautions should
be developed and instituted for one or more particular
practitioners or clinicians in order to make a reasonable accommodation of any handicap that such persons may have, they should be arrived at with a
rational relation between the problem and the intended end result, and spelled out clearly to the persons involved.
Yet, the college may decide that a person who is
HIV positive, and thus, may be subject to an attack of
dementia as a first sign of passing over to full AIDS,"'
has a hepatitis B infection, is subject to epileptic fits,
has a mental illness that causes sudden difficulties, or
is a recovering alcoholic who at times is overtaken by
his or her addiction, should have some enhanced level
of supervision. Moreover, the college may decide that
a student in this condition may need some additional
or special instruction as to how to accommodate the
handicap when he or she is out in practice. Both of
these accommodations should be worked out with the
practitioner or student in consultation with that person's physician.
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Finally, the college should consider the interest
that the patient, in giving his or her informed consent
to the procedure of acupuncture being performed on
his or her body, has in being fully advised of all risks
of that procedure. In my opinion, that means all real
risks, and not those that are imaginary or speculative
or so remote as to approach zero chance of happening.
In making these decisions, the college, of course,
must consider the law and, as much as possible, avoid
situations in which it may become liable. But there
really is no way to avoid the possibility of suit. As the
college must make a decision in an area in which there
are conflicting values and legal rights, one in which
no one really has a definitive and "safe" answer, there
is no way to be certain that someone who is disappointed by the decision reached may not wish to take
this matter to court in order to establish a principle
or remedy a perceived wrong. While, of course, the
college must consider the impact of the law when it
reaches its decision, I urge that the college decide what
is right and what best carries out its vision of itself,
of its mission, and of its responsibility to that mission.
While the decision of how to proceed is, and must
be, that of the college, you have asked for my specific
recommendations. I give them with the understanding
that they are only recommendations; I do not presume
to preempt the college's responsibility to make the
final decisions. My recommendations are as follows:
1. Add to the general informed consent form
of the college a provision recognizing that there
are concerns about the spread of infectious disease, both through body fluids and through the
air. Recognize that, in the nature of things, a
practitioner or clinician from time to time may
have an infection, known or unknown to that
person. Then advise the patient in general of the
precautions that are taken at the college (e.g., the
use of disposable needles, the following of universal precautions established by the American scientific community, the following of clean needle
techniques established by the National Certification Commission for Acupunctures, the precautions taken against transmission of airborne infections). Invite the patient who has any questions
about these matters to inquire further of his or
her individual practitioner.
2. Send a letter to all current patients, acknowledging the concern felt by some because of
the cases of the Florida dentist and of the Baltimore surgeon. Recognize that, in the nature of
things, a practitioner or clinician from time to
time may have an infection, known or unknown
to that person. Then advise the patient in general
of the precautions that are taken at the college
(e.g., the use of disposable needles, the following
of universal precautions established by the American scientific community, the following of clean
needle techniques established by the National
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Certification Commission for Acupuncturists, the
precautions taken against transmission of airborne infections). Invite the patient who has any
questions about these matters to inquire further
of his or her individual practitioner.
3. Review the practitioners' and the clinicians' handbook(s) to be sure that each spells out
clearly the precautions to be taken, including, but
not limited to: do not use a needle on more than
one person; if you accidentally prick yourself with
a needle, do not use that needle on the patient; if
a needle accidentally falls on the floor or touches
any other nonsterile surface, do not use it on
anyone; do not go into a patient's room with any
open sore, no matter how miniscule it is, or with
any weeping dermatitis; if the open sore or dermatitis can be covered completely with a bandage
or bandaid, do so; if not, do not proceed with the
treatment; if a clinician has any open sore or
dermatitis, he or she should call that matter to
the attention of his or her supervisor before going
into a patient's room, and the supervisor shall
decide whether the sore or dermatitis is sufficiently covered and safe for the clinician to proceed into the room; if the practitioner or clinician
is pricked by a needle that has already been used
on a patient, he or she should immediately report
that fact to his or her supervisor. These matters
should also be taught and emphasized in the curriculum, and a student's ability and willingness to
follow them should enter into his or her evaluation.
4. Place into the practitioners' and the clinicians' handbook, and include in the curriculum,
that it is the duty of the practitioner and the
clinician to be sure that the patient has read the
informed consent form and understands it. The
practitioner and clinician have the duty to explain
any portions that appear to be less than fully
understood and perhaps go over orally those portions of the form that the experience of the practitioner has shown are usually not fully understood or appreciated. Furthermore, the practitioner and clinician must be told to expect
questions on infectious disease and other matters.
Those questions may involve questions personal
to the practitioner or clinician. The practitioner
and clinician should be told that he or she should
answer each question honestly to alleviate the
concerns of the patient. Should a patient ask a
personal question that the practitioner or clinician
feels is inappropriate (i.e., seeking information
that would not assist the patient in making the
informed decision as to whether or not to proceed
with the acupuncture therapy), the practitioner or
clinician may refrain from answering, explaining
fully to the patient why the practitioner or clinician has concluded that the question seeks to elicit
information that, in the opinion of the practi48

tioner or clinician, is not material to the weighing
of risks and the decision whether or not to permit
this practioner or clinician to proceed with the
particular procedure. Above all, the practitioner
or clinician should be instructed not to lie in
answering any question.
5. Include in the practitioners' and clinicians' handbook a statement that, if a person has
a handicap, whether a physical infirmity, a mental
problem, or an infection, it should be reported to
his or her supervisor for evaluation of whether the
safety of the patient permits the practitioner or
clinician to proceed, and that every effort will be
made to institute reasonable precautions that will
accommodate the handicap and permit the practitioner or clinician to proceed. Those precautions
must be followed. Those precautions may include
additional supervision, additional barrier precautions, additional techniques to be taught and practiced, and other precautions that would, as much
as possible, accommodate the handicap.
6. There is no need for any practitioner or
clinician to advise a patient or a prospective patient of a specific handicap or condition of the
practitioner or clinician as a part of the informed
consent procedure or otherwise. If the handicap
or condition poses a danger to the patient, the
particular practitioner or clinician shall not treat
patients unless or until the handicap or condition
is remedied (e.g., a flu condition passes) or a
reasonable accommodation, if any is possible, is
made. If the handicap or condition poses no danger to the patient, it is not material to the patient's
decision whether to proceed.
7. As the specific question here concerns
who is HIV positive, when I apply these principles
to this question I recommend as follows: the general informed consent form should be amended as
recommended above; it should be explained by the
practitioner or clinician; the practitioner or clinician should be ready to answer any material question, refrain from answering those questions that
the practitioner or clinician feels are not material,
stating why it is not material, but shall not lie; in
my judgment, whether a practitioner or clinician
is HIV positive is not material to the patient's
decision whether to proceed with the acupuncture
therapy, because it furnishes no appreciable risk
to the patient. Moreover, in consultation with the
student's physician, consideration should be given
to enhanced supervision as well as to some particularized instruction on how he or she is to accommodate his or her handicap in practice. For example, and purely by way of my speculative suggestion, practicing solely in conjunction with
someone else who is educated to look for the signs
of an attack of dementia and warn the handicapped practitioner that a problem is at hand
which may cause danger to patients.
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Conclusion
The problem of how to deal with the HIV positive
health care worker, whether practitioner or student,
is most difficult because it is very emotionally charged.
The media has done a good job of making people
aware of the dangers of AIDS. While that is a positive,
it has had the negative result of raising great emotional fears. It is understandable that a person would
choose to avoid any risk, no matter how remote, of
acquiring the disease. This situation is made more
difficult when rational scientific authorities state to
the media, and through the media to the public, that
they are not certain how HIV infection spreads.
Yet, there are many things known about AIDS
and how HIV infection spreads and does not spread.
This furnishes the basis for some rational action which
will protect the public from real risks and at the same
time protect the HIV positive practitioner from irrational restrictions. This paper has tried to work out a
construct to permit rational discussion and determinations of what that action should be on a situation
by situation basis. While the particular situation that
prompted this paper was of a clinical student in an
acupuncture college, it is believed that the doctrinal
structure is equally applicable to all health care students and practitioners and can provide a valid construct for the resolution of this difficult problem, on a
situation by situation basis throughout the health care
professions.

Postscript
The number of diagnosed AIDS cases continues
to climb. The Centers for Disease Control reports that
as of March 31, 1991, 171,876 persons had been diagnosed with AIDS."' Some 6,436 of those persons are
health care workers. Of those, 47 are surgeons and 171
dentists. Among the others, there are 703 physicians
(presumably, other than surgeons), 116 paramedics,
1,358 nurses, 1,101 medical aides, 941 technicians, and
319 therapists.'50 As some estimates of persons who
are infected with HIV but are not yet symptomatic for
AIDS go as high as 8 times the number of those who
have been diagnosed with AIDS, one can easily assume
that approximately 45,000 of the 5 million health care
workers in the United States are today infected. A
current estimate has a mean of 11 years between initial
infection with HIV and the development of symptomatic AIDS."5 1
Various surveys continue to develop data upon
which experts render opinions. CDC reported recently
that of 3,420 orthopedic surgeons who were tested for
HIV, two were found to be positive.' 5 2 The American
Dental Association reported three HIV positive dentists out of 6,000 tested."' These figures, of one in
1,710 and one in 2,000, are considerably less than the
nine in 1,000 estimated in the general population of
health care workers.
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Furthermore, more surveys of patients of AIDSinfected dentists and surgeons are available. The number of patients of the Johns Hopkins Hospital surgeon,
Dr. Almaraz, who were tested after it was announced
that he died of AIDS-and the hospital offered free
testing, has climbed to 1,800. The number of patients
tested after a Florida orthopedist, Dr. Robert Engel,
announced his retirement because of his AIDS infection is 700. No patient of either practitioner has tested
positive.'5 4
Thus, although now several thousand patients of
HIV-infected surgeons and dentists have been tested,
there are a total of five patients who apparently have
been HIV-infected from a health care worker. All five
were infected through a single dentist, Dr. David
Acer." Dr. Acer was first diagnosed with symptomatic
HIV infection in late 1986 and with AIDS in September 1987.1" He continued practicing until July 1989.1"

Of Dr. Acer's approximately 2,000 patients, 700 have
been tested for HIV, and five have been found positive." No other survey of any infected surgeon or
dentist has confirmed any instance of transmission
from or through a health care worker to a patient.
As another paper in this Symposium notes, from
all of this information,
CDC recently estimated that an HIV-infected surgeon has from 1 in 41,667 to 1 in 416,667 chance
of transmitting HIV to his patient. The estimate
of an infected dentist transmitting the virus to a
patient during a procedure involving a large
amount of blood was estimated at 1 in 263,158 to
1 in 2,631,579.159
Yet, it is under these circumstances that Kimberly
Bergalis became symptomatic of AIDS within 2 years
of infection, while Dr. Acer was still alive. A sample
of Dr. Acer's blood was obtained, and a comparison of
the HIV of Kimberly Bergalis and Dr. Acer showed
very close DNA sequencing, permitting the conclusion
that HIV was transmitted from Dr. Acer to Ms. Bergalis.' Perhaps because of facts like these, coupled
with the fact noted earlier that the mean between
initial infection and the development of symptoms
may be as high as 11 years, the CDC now estimates,
as Dr. Kuvin reports, that 13 to 128 patients have
been infected with HIV from health care workers
during the past decade.'
Two recent cases raise additional and very serious
questions. Each notes the significance of the fourfactor analysis of School Board of Nassau County v.
Arline.'62 Each appears to give conclusive effect to
one of those four factors. One of the cases blows a
large hole through the CDC's definition of "invasive
procedure," and expands the debate far beyond what
had earlier been thought of as a limitation to invasive
procedures. The other expands the concept of "harm"
so as to threaten to refashion the debate rather dramatically. The importance of these two cases is heightened by the fact that they are the first two cases
involving the law applicable to an HIV positive health
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care worker, and, as such, will need to be dealt with
by all subsequent courts considering this issue.
The first case is the Fifth Circuit's decision in
Leckelt v. Board of Commissioners."' Kevin Leckelt
was a licensed practical nurse working at the Terrebone General Medical Center in Houma, Louisiana.
His roommate of some 8 years was diagnosed with
AIDS at the medical center. The medical center had
an infectious control procedure which was generally
applicable to all contagious and infectious diseases.
That policy required any employee who had been
exposed to any infectious disease to report that fact
to the infectious disease officer and, where appropriate, to undergo testing and work restrictions.e In
accordance with that policy, medical center officials
instructed Leckelt to be tested for HIV infection.
Leckelt advised the officials that he had already been
tested, but he refused to turn the results over to the
medical center. Leckelt was then fired for insubordination.
Leckelt sued in federal court, claiming that the
medical center had violated his right under Section
504 of the federal Rehabilitation Act not to be discriminated against. The district court rejected that claim,
holding that "a hospital has a right to require such
testing in order to fulfill its obligation to its employees
and to the public concerning infection control and
health and safety in general," and, therefore, the medical center "was justified in terminating" Leckelt for
insubordination for refusing to provide the results of
his HIV antibody test.'15 The court of appeals affirmed.
The court of appeals noted that the hospital's
requirements were consonant with CDC and American
Hospital Association guidelines that, if a health care
worker is exposed to the blood or other bodily fluids
of a patient infected with the HIV virus, he or she
should be tested by the health care facility and counseled about the risk of infection. Furthermore, these
guidelines provide that the facility, in conjunction
with the worker's personal physician, should determine how, if at all, the exposed worker's duties should
be restricted or modified in order to protect patients
from the spread of infection and the health care
worker from exposure to other infectious diseases of
patients.166 The court also referred to the fact that
Leckelt earlier had a medical history of hepatitis B,
syphilis, and lymphadenopathy, and had not reported
at least some of these facts to the medical center, as
was required by the medical center's universal proce-

dures.167

The court attempted to draw its holding narrowly,
concluding
that the district court was not clearly erroneous
in finding that Leckelt was not "otherwise qualified" to perform his job as a licensed practical
nurse because of his failure to comply with [the
medical center's] policies for monitoring infectious disease, such as HIV.1'

While willful failure to follow a hospital's reasonable infectious disease procedures is an unexceptional
ground for discipline, even termination, of a health
care worker, the expressed reasoning of the Fifth
Circuit in applying this principle to the facts in Leckelt
raises some significant questions in terms of the assumptions of the ongoing debate. For example, the
court noted that Arline presented a four-factor analysis-(a) the nature of the risk; (b) the duration of the
risk; (c) the severity of the risk; and (d) the probabilities that the disease will be transmitted-and, furthermore, that Arline referred expressly to a "significant risk" of transmittal."' Then the Fifth Circuit
rejected Leckelt's argument that he posed no significant risk to patients, because in the case of HIV
infection "there is no cure . . . and the potential harm

of HIV infection is extremely high."'
Thus, the Fifth Circuit appears to be saying that,
if the third Arline factor-the severity of the risk-is
certain death, the fact that "the probability that a
health care worker will transmit HIV to a patient may
be extremely low and can be further minimized
through the use of universal precautions" is immaterial.' The necessary implication of that reasoning is
that, since HIV disease is invariably fatal based upon
present knowledge, even the most remote chance of
transmittal is enough to justify severe restrictions or
even termination of a health care worker.
Leckelt also argued that he did not perform invasive procedures as defined by the CDC, and, indeed,
the Fifth Circuit so found.' 72 However, the Fifth Circuit went on to find that "at least some of [Leckelt's]
duties provided potential opportunities for HIV transmittal to patients."' Thus, the Fifth Circuit appears
to be expanding the CDC's concept of "invasive procedures" to include any procedure that would permit
HIV transmittal to a patient should the health care
worker bleed into any opening in the patient's skin.
The procedures referred to-starting intravenous interventions, injecting medication, performing catheterization, changing dressings, and administering enemas-include procedures performed by most, if not
all, nurses, physician assistants, paramedics, health
aides, and the like.
Finally, in response to Leckelt's argument that a
nurse who followed universal precautions was "little
to no risk" to his or her patients, the Fifth Circuit
pointed to testimony that "approximately 5 to 10% of
the time health care workers do not comply with
recommended universal precautions.""' The Fifth
Circuit referred to (a) testimony of a hospital patient
that, in January 1984, Leckelt had not worn gloves
while ministering to her, and (b) the fact that Leckelt
had not reported all of his personal infections to the
hospital's infectious disease officer in violation of clear
hospital policy. 7 s
When these two strands of reasoning are combined, the debate is completely altered. The debate up
to now has been over the HIV positive surgeon or
dentist whose hand or finger is in an open wound or
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cavity of a patient, in a location where there are sharp
instruments that can cut the health care worker in
such a manner that the health care worker will bleed
into the open wound or cavity before he or she has a
chance to remove the injured hand or finger. To date,
the debate has been as to whether such a surgeon or
dentist should continue practicing surgery or dentistry
without a specific showing that that person is not
practicing proper hygienic procedures and so is a
"significant risk" of transmitting HIV disease.17 6
The Fifth Circuit's reasoning would not limit a
hospital or clinic from firing or restricting solely HIV
positive persons who engage in invasive procedures,
as previously understood, but would extend them to
any HIV positive health care worker who is engaged
in any activity that causes, or is over or around, any
opening in the skin of the patient, and who, by any
remote possibility, might bleed into the opening.
Moreover, even assurances by the health care worker
that he or she would follow universal precautions
would not be enough, if the hospital believes that a
sufficient percentage of time health care workers do
not follow such procedures. If this reasoning is followed by other courts, the debate is significantly altered and the four-fold analysis of Arline would appear
to be all but inoperable in the case of HIV-infected
health care workers.
The other recent development is a decision by the
New Jersey Superior Court in Behringer v. Medical
Center at Princeton.'7 7 This case, too, raises questions

that will change the terms of the debate. Dr. William
Behringer, an otolaryngologist (ear, nose, and throat
surgeon) and a plastic surgeon, a member of the staff
of the medical center, was diagnosed as suffering from
AIDS. The medical center at first suspended Dr. Behringer, and then permitted him to practice surgery
only with the consent of patients who had first been
told specifically that Dr. Behringer had AIDS. His
practice dried up. Dr. Behringer sued, claiming that
the medical center had violated his rights under the
New Jersey Law Against Discrimination. Apparently,
no violation of federal statutory rights were alleged.
Superior Court Judge Carchman first held that
Dr. Behringer, as an HIV-infected person, was handicapped within the meaning of the New Jersey Law
and, hence was protected by it.178 However, the court
then upheld the medical center's action, holding that
it was "substantially justified by a reasonable probability of harm to the patient." 7
Judge Carchman noted the medical center's
concession that their only reason for restricting Dr.
Behringer's practice was his positive AIDS diagnosis,
and that this constituted a prima facie case of discrimination under the New Jersey Law. The burden then
shifted to the medical center to show that Dr. Behringer posed a "'reasonable probability of substantial
harm' to others"; the medical center had
the burden of "establish[ing] with a reasonable
degree of certainty that it reasonably arrived at
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the opinion that the employee's handicap presented a materially enhanced harm in the workplace.""s
The court noted that the medical center had made
"painstaking inquiries" into what was right, referring
to many existing guidelines and the literature of the
time. The medical center concluded that, if a physician
poses "any risk" of harm, it was enough to preclude
the procedure.'"' The court concluded that reasonable
persons may differ as to "whether there is 'any' risk
involved," but that, if the procedure transmitted HIV
disease, it would lead to the death of the patient. But,
the court went on, the decision would also need to
consider that the resulting denial of practice would
affect the physician's ultimate ability to practice his
or her chosen profession.'8 2
To reach a solution, the court concluded, one must
look to the doctrine of informed consent, which "provides the necessary element of patient control. . . ."
This doctrine protects the patient's "right to selfdetermination in matters of medical treatment." As a
part of the informed consent requirement, the physician has the duty "to explain, in words the patient can
understand, that medical information and those risks
which are material" (i.e., those to which "a reasonable
patient would be likely to attach significance ... in

deciding whether or not to submit to the treatment". 83
The risk, however, was held to be not the risk of
transmission of HIV alone. Rather, the court found,
wherever the HIV positive physician suffers a needlestick or cut, the previously uninfected patient will
need to undergo "months or even years of continual
HIV testing." The court quoted from the literature
that:
Studies indicate that a surgeon will cut a glove in
approximately one out of every four cases, and
probably sustain a significant cut in one out of
every forty cases."
Thus, the harm that a patient risks from an HIVinfected surgeon is not limited to transmission alone,
the risk of which the court conceded was "small" and
"may be reduced by the use of universal precautions."'" But the harm that a patient risks also includes
HIV testing over an extended period with the
attendant anxiety of waiting for test results, and
the possible alterations to lifestyle and child-bearing during the testing period, even if those results
ultimately are negative.se
This was a risk which, from studies done, Professor
Gostin estimated would become real in 2.5% of the
operations performed by an HIV positive surgeon.
Based on these facts, the court concluded:
In assessing the "materiality of risk," this Court
concludes that the risk of accident and implications thereof would be a legitimate concern to the
surgical patient, warranting disclosure of this risk
in the informed consent setting.
51

When weighing the patient's right to know as
against the physician's right to continuing practice,
"the patient's rights must prevail" under New Jersey's
"strong policy supporting patient's rights . . . ."
At a minimum, the physician must withdraw from
performing any invasive procedure which would
pose a risk to the patient. Where the ultimate
harm is death, even the presence of a low risk of
transmission justifies the adoption of a policy
which precludes invasive procedures when there
is "any" risk of transmission . . . . If there is to be

an ultimate arbiter of whether the patient is to be
treated invasively by an AIDS positive surgeon,
the arbiter will be the fully informed patient. The
ultimate risk to the patient is so absolute-so
devastating-that it is untenable to argue against
informed consent combined with a restriction on
procedures which present "any risk" to the patient."s
Judge Carchman thus shares with the Fifth Circuit
in Leckelt the opinion that, because the result of AIDS
infection is certain death, the "severity of the risk"
factor of Arline overwhelms the other factors in the
analysis. But, by expanding the concept of harm to
include the necessity of testing, the anxiety, and the
impact upon the life of the patient who ultimately
tests negative, Judge Carchman changes the debate
substantially-even under the Arline analysis. Now,
it is no longer the 1 in 41,667 to 1 in 416, 667 (surgeon)
or 1 in 263,158 to 1 in 2,631,579 (dentist) risk of doing
harm (i.e., transmission of HIV infection reported by
Drs. Pierce, Fisher, and Rabin elsewhere in this Symposium as CDC's recent estimate). Now it is the 1 in
40 risk of a significant cut in the surgeon reported by
Professor Gostin which triggers harm even in the
overwhelming instances where the patient is ultimately found not to have contracted the disease.
Read together, Leckelt and Behringer will change
the terms of the debate rather significantly. They
make even more urgent the agreement of an analytical
framework within which to evaluate the rights of all
concerned. The failure to do so may result in the
banishment of the now 40,000 to 50,000 health care
workers who are unfortunate enough to have become
infected, depriving them of their livelihood and society
of their services for several years between infection
and death. To subject the Kimberly Bergalises of
tomorrow to any realistic risk of becoming infected is
a wrong. To subject others, although ultimately proven
negative, to the months and even years of testing,
anxiety, and significant impact upon their lifestyles is
a wrong. But to banish tens of thousands of trained,
willing workers where, in the real world, they provide
no realistic risk, is also wrong. The line must be found
that will reconcile each of these values in a way valid
in science, in law, and in humaneness to all concerned.
The most appropriate analytical framework is one
that looks at the risk in reality, not one perceived in
emotion, bias, and prejudice. There is always some
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risk. If a person rides a bus and an HIV positive fellow
passenger suddenly cuts himself, spewing blood into
an open sore of his neighbor, there is a risk of transmittal of HIV disease. The same risk is present when
one walks on the street, shops in a store, etc. Life is
not without such risks. Thus, to take what appears to
be an extreme in the health care worker, if one is a
patient of a psychiatrist, who normally does no more
than shake hands and listen, and that psychiatrist
bumps his head, spewing blood into an open sore of
the patient, there is a risk of transmittal. But in each
one of these situations, the risk is remote, at best.
The analytical framework that appears best to
reconcile all of the competing values is one that looks
at risk in a real situation. As the surgeon, we are told
by studies, significantly cuts him or herself once in
every 40 procedures while within a cavity or wound of
the patient, there is a real risk of harm, with a significant incidence of occurrence-as long as harm is
looked at as broader than transmission, to include the
need for testing, the anxiety, and the effect on the life
of the person who ultimately tests negative. On the
other hand, if the health care worker is not involved
in such a risky procedure, then the risk may be no
greater than highly remote. The evaluation must be
made on a position by position basis, and must focus
upon actual risk as provided by the science of the
time. Any other solution is one based upon emotion,
bias, and prejudice either for or against one of the
actors in this tragic drama. That cannot be the law.
Where there is real risk, the question often asked
is whether informed consent should be sought. But
that seems to be the wrong question. Where there is
real risk, the consent of the patient should not be able
to override what should be the better judgment of the
practitioner: don't do it. Clearly, the patient should
not be asked to consent to malpractice. And placing a
patient under a real risk situation, even with his or
her consent, just cannot be good health practice.
Upon this analysis, the result in Behringerseems
right, although the ambivalence of Judge Carchman
at the end of the opinion concerning the use of informed consent would appear to be wrong. The reasoning in Leckelt, on the other hand, appears to be
wrong. That a nurse does change dressings, administer
intravenous therapy, etc., does not put the nurse into
a cavity or open wound of the patient where there are
sharp instruments on which a nurse is wont to cut
him or herself. Nor does the Fifth Circuit attempt to
justify its reasoning on those grounds.
It is very easy, with a disease as emotionally
charged as HIV, to fear that whenever a person who
is HIV positive is near a patient who has some opening
through his skin, somehow some blood of the HIV
positive person will get into that opening, thus transmitting HIV. While no one can ever ensure or guarantee that that will not happen to some person someday, no such guarantee can be given in all of the other
contacts of daily living. The question is not whether
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anyone can guarantee that it will never happen but
whether, based upon the science of the time, there is
any real risk of it happening. Therein should lie the
framework of an analysis across the spectrum of the
HIV positive health care worker.
Finally, Leckelt and Behringer have one more
factor in common: each looks to the institution primarily for the decision. In each case, the court notes
how the institution worked diligently to find the right
result, drawing upon the guidelines issued by professional groups such as the CDC and the American
Hospital Association. While the decision of the institution is not given unfettered rein, that decision, arrived at through rational exploration and consonant
with the thought-through positions of recognized organizations, is given much deference in each case. And
that is as it should be. Whether the institution is the
academy or a hospital or clinic, the ultimate decision
should be that of the professionals in the institution.
And, as long as the decision of the institution is
rationally based, gives due regard for the various values involved, and tramples on no rights arbitrarily,
that decision should be upheld.
Address reprint requests to: Professor L. Sherman Cohn,
Georgetown University Law Center, 600 New Jersey Avenue, N.W.,
Washington, DC 20001.
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